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Michelle Obama: 
A Contemporary Analysis of Race and Gender 
Discrimination through the Lens of Title VII 
Gregory S. Parkst & Quinetta M. Robersont * 
"Meet the new political wife. She has a career; she has 
opInIOns a partner in every way .... And now, she's become 
controversial. " 
Ted Koppel 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The 2008 presidential campaign is historic given the presence of a 
Black candidate (Barack Obama) and a woman candidate (Hillary Clinton). 
Not only is it historic that Americans had a real opportunity to elect the 
first Black or woman president, it is also the first time that Americans are 
faced with the prospect of having a Black First Lady Michelle Obama. 
As such, the presidential campaign provides a useful context in which to 
analyze how race and gender attitudes influence voting behavior. 2 Even 
Senator Clinton analogized the 2008 presidential election campaign to a 
hiring decision in the employment context. 3 Underlying this analogy is the 
t Law Clerk, u.s. Dislrict Cotnt for the Dislrict of Maryland (2{)()9..201O); Law Clerk, Dislrict of 
Columbia Cotnt of Appeals (2008-2009). B.S., Howard University; M.S., City University of New YOlk; 
MA, Ph.D., University of Kentucky; J.D., Corneu Law School. 
:t Professor, Villanova School of Business. B.S., University of Delaware; M.B.A, University of 
Pittsburgh; Ph.D., University of Maryland 
The authors thank Rebecca Soquier for her tireless work editing and BlueBooking this 
article. We also thank Jeffrey 1. Rachlinski for his input on early drafts of this article. All 
errors are the authors', 
* Although the 200S Presidential election has passed, this article continues to uses "Senator 
Ohama" when referring to now President-elect Ohama as this analysis is focused on his candidacy, not his 
actions as or society's perception ofrum as President-elect - &is. 
1. Joan Vennochi, Op-Ed, A Delicate line for Michelle Obama, B. GWBE, March 2, 2OOS, at D9 
(quoting Ted Koppel's reference to First Lady Hillary Clinton). 
2. See generally GregO!}' S. ParlG & Jeffrey 1. Rachlinski, A Better Metric: The Role of 
Unconscious Race and Gender Bias in the 200S Presidential Race 37-40 (Cornell Legal Stud. Research, 
Paper No. OS.()()7), available at http://papers.ssm.comIso13lpapers.cfin? abstracUd= 11 02704. 
3. Jim Acosta et a1., Clinton: IhinkAbout IhisasaHiringDedsion, CNN.COMPouncs,May IS, 
2008, http://www.cnn.comI2008lPOUTICSI05/181campaign.wrap! index.htmL 
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notion that voters stand in the shoes of employers, and candidates stand in 
the shoes of prospective employees. Thus, the same principles and modes 
of analysis that apply to employment discrimination may apply to voting 
behavior. If it is apropos to analogize elections to hiring decisions, new 
frontiers in employment discrimination law that involve the intersection of 
race and gender,4 the role of implicit bias,5 and third-party associative 
discrimination6 are implicated. In essence, the Title VII framework 
provides a template for how certain aspects of the 2008 Presidential 
election can be understood. Here, we focus on the role of Michelle Obama. 
If voters harbored race stereotypes and biases about Senator Obama, 
and if voters harbored gender stereotypes and biases about Senator Clinton 
during her campaign, then it is reasonable to believe that both types of 
preconceptions may have influenced voters' perceptions about Mrs. 
Obama. Some researchers have proposed models that describe the role of 
First Ladies. 7 Gladys Lang offered a model of status based upon a 
woman's relationship with her spouse. According to that model, women 
may possess one of the following types of status: I) satellite status, which 
implies that a woman defines herself through her spouse and possesses no 
independent ideas; 2) sponsored status, which implies that a woman 
achieves recognition by her relationship with a prominent spouse; or 3) 
autonomous status, which implies that a woman's conferred recognition is 
based on her own ideas and actions independent of her spouse. 8 Watson 
presents a similar typology (specific to First Ladies) categorizing the wives 
on a continuum from non-partners to full partners based on their 
relationships with their husbands. 9 He argues that only Eleanor Roosevelt, 
Rosalyn Carter, and Hillary Clinton, have achieved full partnership based 
on their professionalization, integration into the political agenda, and 
activism. 10 While such spousal roles have earned these First Ladies 
4. See Moore v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 708 F.2d 475 (9th Cir. 1982); Payne v. 
Travenol Lab., Inc., 673 F.2d 798 (5th Cir. 1982); Jeffries v. Harris County Cmty. Action 
Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980); DeGraffenreid v. Gen. Motors Assembly Div., 558 
F .2d 480 (8th Cir. 1977); Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 538 F.2d 164 (7th Cir. 
1976); Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Carswell v. 
Peachford Hosp., No. C80-222A, 1981 WL 224, at *1 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Paulette M. 
Caldwell, A Hairpiece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE 
L.J. 365,371-381 (1991). 
5. See Section III infra on Implicit Bias and VoterfEmployment Discrimination. 
6. See Section IV infra on Third-Party Standing and VoterfEmployment 
Discrimination. 
7. See HEARTH AND HOME: IMAGES OF WOMEN tN THE MAss MEDIA (Gaye Tuchman 
et al. eds., 1978). 
8. Gladys Engel Lang, The Most Admired Woman: Image-making in the News, in 
HEARTH AND HOME: IMAGES OF WOMEN IN THE MAss MEDIA 147 (Gaye Tuchman et al. eds., 
1978). 
9. R. P. WATSON, THE PRESIDENT'S WIVES: REASSESSING THE OFFICE OF THE FIRST 
LADY 1-10 (1999). 
10. Id. at 6. 
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acclaim for their knowledge of, and involvement in, the political agenda, 
these women have also received the most criticism for their roles as "co-
presidents." I I That is, until now. 
Michelle Obama, wife of President-elect, Senator Barack Obama, 
contravenes conventional stereotypes of presidential candidates' wives. 
First, she has been direct and plain spoken described as "tough, and 
even a little steely.,,12 In February of 2008, Republicans branded her as 
unpatriotic. 13 The critique stemmed from her comment during a discussion 
of the level of political engagement she was witnessing among Americans: 
"For the first time in my adult lifetime, I am really proud of my country." 14 
Second, when asked about what role she saw for herself as the potential 
First Lady, she noted that work-family balance would be one of her top 
priorities. 15 This is not surprising given that she seems concerned about 
empowering women. Speaking of that broader concern, during a speech 
she gave in Las Vegas, she noted, "We sat back too long, suffering in 
silence, avoiding these challenges. We can't do that any longer. We need 
a man," stopping to correct herself, "a person who happens to be a man, 
who is ready to help us turn the page to bring a new conversation to the 
table, to change the lives of women and children across America." I 6 
Mrs. Obama also was not shy about expressing her views on race 
issues. At Princeton, Mrs. Obama was interested in social change and ran a 
literacy program for local neighborhood children. 17 She also wrote her 
senior sociology thesis on "Princeton-Educated Blacks and the Black 
Community.,,'8 In it she wrote, "[Princeton] made me far more aware of 
my 'blackness' than ever before.,,19 She went on to write, "Regardless of 
the circumstances under which 1 interact with Whites at Princeton it often 
seems as if, to them, I will always be Black first and a student second."2o 
As a student at Harvard Law School, she protested that institution's paucity 
of minority students and professors. 21 On the campaign trail, she noted her 
awareness that some voters were concerned about Senator Obama's 
II. G.D. Wekkin, Role Constraints and First Ladies, 37 SOC. SCI. J. 601-10 (2000); 
Gil Troy, Mr. & Mrs. President? The Rise and Fall o/the Co-Presidency, 37 Soc. SCI. J. 
591-600 (2000). 
12. Richard Wolffe, Barack's Rock, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 2S, 2007, at 5. 
13. Vennochi, supra note I, at 9D; Lisa Wangsness, Michelle Obama's Candor Cuts 
2 Ways: Backers Delighted, but Her Critics Fume, B. GLOBE, Feb. 21, 2008, at BI. 
14. Wangsness, supra note 13, at BI (Mrs. Obama later clearly indicated that what 
she meant was that she was "proud of this country, and I'm proud of the fact that people are 
ready to roll up their sleeves and do something phenomenal."). 
15. Liz Halloran, From the Soccer Field to the Stump, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REp., 
Feb. II, 200S, at 14. 
16. Gwen Ifill, Beside Barack, Sept. 2007, at 5. 
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electability due to his race. In response, she was more than willing to draw 
parallels between Senator Obama's candidacy and Black freedom fighters of 
the past. 22 She also was quite willing to indicate that such hesitance is "the 
bitter legacy of racism and discrimination and oppression in this country."n 
Mrs. Obama is an ardent supporter and fierce defender of her husband. 
After one of his debates, she called his campaign team and bluntly made her 
concerns clear. She indicated that Senator Clinton had packed the crowd with 
her supporters, and that as a result, Senator Obama had been booed whenever 
he criticized Senator Clinton. She told Senator Obama's aides that she did not 
want that to happen again. One senior Obama aide who attended the meeting 
described the incident as one of "a spouse saying, 'Do not do this to my 
husband again. ",24 
Despite her support for her husband, Mrs. Obama is no "traditional 
Stepford booster, smiling vacantly at her husband and sticking to a script of 
carefu11y vetted blandishments.,,25 She was, in her words, making sure Senator 
Obama was "keeping it real.,,26 She did this by holding him accountable for 
his responsibilities, even the most mundane, as a husband and father. For 
instance, she insisted that Senator Obama return to Chicago despite being on 
the campaign trail to attend his daughters' ballet recitals and parent-teacher 
conferences.27 Additionally, she has poked fun at her husband - commenting 
on his snoring, morning breath, failure to put his socks in the hamper, and 
leaving the butter out after breakfast. 28 When introduced at a speech in 
Wisconsin, the woman who introduced Michelle accidentally said she was 
"honored to introduce the next president!" Mrs. Obama stepped to the podium 
with a big smile and told the crowd, "I like that promotion that 1 got. 1 don't 
know if Barack knows yet. We can announce it on the news tonight. He's 
going to be the First Lady.,,29 Her tactic, in her words, was to humanize her 
husband for the public, so when he turns out not to be perfect, they will not be 
disappointed. 30 Ultimately she scaled back such comments, realizing that 
some supporters believed her comments were emasculating. 3 1 
In addition to her outspokenness, Mrs. Obama's educational and 
professional background is also notable. She grew up on the South Side of 
Chicago to working-class parents. She excelled in school, skipping 
22. See Allison Samuels, Daring to Touch the Third Rail: Barack Obama Avoids 
Talking About the 'Race Issue. ' but His Wife Doesn't, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 28, 2008, at 39, 40. 
23 Margaret Talev, Obama's Wife Reaches Out to Black Women, CHARLOTTE 
OBSERVER, Nov. 22, 2007, at 7A. 




28. Id.; Melinda Henneberger, The Obama Marriage, SLATE, Oct. 26, 2007, at 5. 
29. Wolffe, supra note 12, at 29. 
30. Henneberger, supra note 28. 
31. Id. 
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second grade and went on to earn her undergraduate degree from 
Princeton and a law degree from Harvard. 32 After law school, she 
practiced law at the Chicago offices of the law finn Sidley Austin and 
most recently worked as a vice president of Community Relations for the 
University of Chicago Hospitals. 33 By all accounts, Mrs. Obama is an 
unconventional spouse to a presidential candidate and will likely be so as 
First Lady. 
Part II of this Article investigates the role that explicit attitudes about 
race and gender play on voting decisions and the way they intersect in 
employment decisions. Scholarship from the areas of political science 
and law illustrate the challenges that Michelle Obama faced as a 
candidate's spouse and soon-to-be First Lady. Part III investigates 
implicit ("unconscious") race and gender biases and the role they play in 
behavior, including voting and employment discrimination. Despite the 
racial progress the United States has made, scholarship from the areas of 
cognitive and social psychology as well as law illustrate the deep-seated 
biases Mrs. Obama likely faced and will continue to face. Part IV 
investigates the role of third-party employment discrimination, where 
employees (typically White) are discriminated against because of the race 
of their associates (typically Black). We extrapolate from jurisprudence 
in this area to make some inferences about how attitudes about Michelle 
Obama may have worked against her husband's candidacy for the 
presidency of the United States. We conclude by exploring why negative 
attitudes about Mrs. Obama may have dissipated over the course of 
Senator Obama's presidential run and the role her presence in the White 
House will have in de-biasing peopl e- at the implicit level - about 
Black women. 
II. RACE AND GENDER: INTERSECTIONALITY IN 
EMPLOYMENT AND VOTING DISCRIMINATION 
Race and gender are powerful variables that influence people's 
decision making and behavior in a variety of contexts. Politics and 
employment are among them. However, in addition to these variables in 
isolation, their intersection has mUltiplicative predictive value. 
A. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
If we assume Senator Clinton'S assessment that elections are like 
"hiring decisions,,,34 then voter discrimination becomes an analog of 
employment discrimination. In this context, Title VII of the Civil Rights 
32. Karen Springen & Jonathan Darman, Ground Support, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 29, 
2007, at 40. 
33. Id. 
34. Acosta, supra note 3. 
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Act of 1964 is implicated by the roles of race and gender in the 2008 
presidential election. Under Title VII, employers may not discriminate 
because of - among other factors - race, color, and sex.35 The landmark 
cases that provide the litmus test for race and sex discrimination in the 
workplace are McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green36 and Price Waterhouse 
v. Hopkins,37 respectively. Under the burden-shifting framework of 
McDonnell Douglas, a complainant establishes a prima facie case for racial 
discrimination when he shows that: (i) he is a racial minority; (ii) he 
applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking 
applicants; (iii) despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) after his 
rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek 
applicants with the complaintant's qualifications. 38 If the complainant 
establishes his prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the employer to 
articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for rejecting the 
applicant. 39 The employer cannot, however, use the applicant's conduct as 
pretext for discrimination nor may the employer engage in racial double-
standards. 40 The burden then shifts back to the applicant to demonstrate 
that the reason proffered by the employer was pretextual that is, was not 
the true reason for the employment decision. Rather, the employer's true 
motive for rejecting the candidate was discriminatory.41 This may be done 
directly by demonstrating that a discriminatory reason more than likely 
motivated the employer's decision or indirectly by showing that the 
employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. 42 
In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court found clear signs that some of 
the company's partners reacted negatively to a female employee's 
personality because she was a woman. 43 Partners described her as 
"macho," suggested that she "overcompensated for being a woman," and 
advised her to take "a course at charm schooL"44 Another representative of 
the company described the employee as someone who had "matured from a 
tough-talking somewhat masculine hard-nosed [manager] to an 
authoritative, formidable, but much more appealing lady [partner] 
candidate.,,45 Most significant was the statement from one board member 
as to what the employee needed to do in order to improve her chances to be 
promoted to partner. He advised her to "walk more femininely, talk more 
35. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(I) (2000). 
36. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
37. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
38. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. 
39. [d. at 802-03. 
40. [d. at 804. 
41. [d. at 804-805. 
42. Tex. Dep't ofCmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,256 (1981). 
43. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 235 (1989). 
44. [d. 
45. [d. 
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femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and 
wear jewelry.,,46 Social psychologist Dr. Susan Fiske, an expert witness, 
testified "that the partnership selection process at Price Waterhouse was 
likely influenced by sex stereotyping.,,47 Her testimony focused on the 
overtly sex-based comments of partners as well as on the gender-neutral 
remarks made by partners who knew Hopkins only slightly, but were 
intensely critical of her.48 According to Fiske, Hopkins' status as the only 
woman in the pool of candidates, combined with the subjectivity of the 
evaluations, made it likely that the sharply critical remarks resulted from 
sex stereotyping.49 The Court found that in previous years, other female 
candidates for partnership were also evaluated in sex-based terms. 50 Those 
who maintained their femininity were viewed favorably while "women's 
Iib[b ]er" was used as a pejorative term for other female employees. 5 I 
The Court held in Price Waterhouse that sex-stereotyped remarks in 
the employment setting "do not inevitably prove that gender played a part 
in a particular employment decision.,,52 The employee "must show that the 
employer actually relied on her gender in making its decision."n "In 
making this showing, stereotyped remarks can certainly be evidence that 
sex played a part."S4 The Court went on to hold that in a mixed-motive 
case (where there is both a possible legitimate as well as a discriminatory 
motive for the employment decision) the employer must show that its 
legitimate reason, standing alone, would have induced it to make the same 
decision. 55 
B. VOTING BEHAVIOR 
Voting is not always based on rational choice; emotions also playa 
significant role. 56 William Christ, for example, found that emotional 
responses to candidates accurately predict voter preferences for more than 
ninety percent of decided voters and eighty percent of undecided voters. 57 
Most political advertisements are designed to either inspire voter 
enthusiasm, by motivating their political engagement and loyalty, or induce 
fear, by stimulating vigilance against the risks some candidates supposedly 
46. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235. 
47. /d. 
48. /d. 
49. Id. at 235-36. 
50. Id. at 236. 
51. Id. 
52. /d. at 251. 
53. /d. 
54. /d. 
55. Id. at 252. 
56. See DREW WESTEN, THE POLITICAL BRAIN: THE ROLE OF EMOTION IN DECIDING 
THE FATE OF THE NATION xiii-xv (2007). 
57. William G. Christ, Voter Preference and Emotion: Using Emotional Response to 
Classify Decided and Undecided Voters, 15 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 237, 250 (1985). 
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pose. 58 Other research shows that political advertisements that provoke 
anxiety stimulate attention toward the campaign and discourage reliance on 
habitual cues for voting; in other words, advertisements of this type can 
induce crossover voting. S9 Likeability also affects voting. One study has 
shown that disengaged voters who watched entertainment-oriented talk 
show interviews of Al Gore and George W. Bush were more likely to vote 
against their party loyalties when they found the crossover candidate 
likeable.60 As with most decisions, both passion and reason influence 
voting, so it is no surprise that emotionally evocative concepts like race and 
gender impact voting. 
1. Race and Voting 
Race has long held currency among Americans in their 
determinations of whom to elect to public office. Because Black and 
White voters typically prefer candidates of their own race in elections 
where one candidate is Black and the other is White, Black candidates 
rarely succeed outside of political jurisdictions in which Blacks are a 
majority of the voters. 61 
Experimental research supports the idea that Black candidates face 
significant hurdles in gaining support from White voters. In one study, 
Nayda Terkildsen found that given two fictitious candidates described 
identically on dimensions other than race, White voters are more likely 
to vote for the White candidate over either a dark-skinned or light-
skinned Black candidate. 62 Furthermore, racially prejudiced White 
58. Ted Brader, Striking a Responsive Chord: How Political Ads Motivate and 
Persuade Voters by Appealing to Emotions, 49 AM. J. POL. SCI. 388, 393-97 (2005). 
59. George E. Marcus & Michael B. Mackuen, Anxiety. Enthusiasm. and the Vote: 
The Emotional Underpinnings of Learning and Involvement During Presidential 
Campaigns, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 672, 677-78 (1993). 
60. Matthew A. Baum, Talking the Vote: Why Presidential Candidates Hit the Talk 
Show Circuit, 49 AM. J. POL. SCI. 213,223-30 (2005). 
61. See LUCIUS J. BARKER ET AL., AFRICAN AMERICANS AND THE AMERICAN 
POLITICAL SYSTEM 247 (1999); HANES WALTON, JR. & ROBERT C. SMITH, AMERICAN 
POLITICS AND THE AFRICAN AMERICAN QUEST FOR UNIVERSAL FREEDOM 178-81 (2000). At 
the state level, only one of the fifty "elected" state governors is Black (Deval Patrick of 
Massachusetts); Senator Obama is the only Black member of the U.S. Senate. Up to year 
the 2000, only four Blacks had ever served in the U.S. Senate, and only two since 
Reconstruction. Id. The House of Representatives is more representative, with nearly ten 
percent of its members being Black, but this success is attributable to racial gerrymandering 
of House Districts. In areas dominated by Whites, Black electoral success is rare. This 
relationship between racial make-up of districts and electability of Blacks has been weJl-
demonstrated. See David A. Bositis, The Future of Majority-Minority Districts and African-
American and Hispanic Legislative Representation, in REDISTRICTING AND MINORITY 
REPRESENTATION: LEARNING FROM THE PAST, PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE 942 (David A. 
Bostis ed., 1998); Lisa Handley et aI., Electing Minority-Preferred Candidates to 
Legislative Office: The Relationship Between Minority Percentages in Districts and the 
Election of Minority-Preferred Candidates, in RACE AND REDISTRICTING IN THE 1990s 13-38 
(Bernard Grofman ed., 1998). 
62. Nayda Terkildsen, When White Voters Evaluate African-American Candidates: 
Winter 2009] MICHELLE OBAMA 11 
voters expressed more negative attitudes about Black candidates than 
less prejudiced White voters. 63 
Experimental research by Donald Kinder and David Sears 
demonstrates the mechanism through which race can influence voting.64 
Kinder and Sears tested competing theories of White prejudice against 
Blacks - realistic group conflict theory (emphasizing tangible threats that 
Blacks might pose to Whites' private lives) and symbolic racism 
(emphasizing moralistic resentment of Blacks) - as predictors of Whites' 
voting behavior. Specifically, they tested these theories in light of the 1969 
and 1973 Los Angeles mayoral campaigns in which Thomas Bradley 
(Black/liberal) and Samuel Yorty (White/conservative) were the 
candidates. 65 They found that more prejudiced individuals supported Yorty 
and that symbolic racism better predicts White voting behavior than group 
conflict theory. 66 
The success of Black candidates is related to several factors. First, 
Whites are less likely to engage in racial cross-over voting (in mayoral, city 
council, or congressional elections) when the incumbent is White. 67 They 
are also less likely to vote for Black candidates who run for higher level 
(i.e., top (city)) positions. 68 Furthermore, Whites are less likely to engage 
in cross-over voting in general elections or run-off elections. 69 They are 
also less likely to engage in cross-over voting when the local press does not 
endorse the Black candidate. 70 
Second, few Blacks vis-a-vis Whites at the community level have a 
negative impact on Whites' cross-over voting.7l Presumably, as close 
inter-racial interactions increase, "the probability that [Whites] will adopt 
political attitudes and behaviors similar to those [Blacks] with whom they 
interact increases."n Conversely, at the macro-level (e.g., statewide), with 
The Processing Implications of Candidate Skin Color, Prejudice, and Self-Monitoring, 37 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 1032, 1040 (1993). 
63. Terkildsen, supra note 62, at 1043. 
64. Donald R. Kinder & David O. Sears, Prejudice and Politics: Symbolic Racism 
Versus Racial Threats to the Good Life, 40 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 414 (1981). 
65. Id.at417. 
66. Id. at 421-26. 
67. Charles S. Bullock, III, Racial Crossover Voting and the Election of Black 
Officials, 46 J. POL. 238, 247 (1984). 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. Endorsements of the Black candidate by local white-controlled newspapers 
in biracial elections provide White voters with "important voting cues as to the candidates' 
qualifications and political acceptability .... " Joel Lieske, The Political Dynamics of Urban 
Voting Behavior, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 150, 154 (1989). 
71. Thomas M. Carsey, The Contextual Effects of Race on White Voter Behavior: 
The 1989 New York City Mayoral Election, 57 J. POL. 221, 225-27 (1995); Lisa C. 
DeLorenzo et aI., The Impact of Cross-Racial Voting on St. Louis Primary Election Results, 
33 URB. AFF. REv. 120, 125-30 (1997). 
72. Carsey, supra note 71, at 223. 
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more Blacks vis-a-vis Whites, the perception of racial threat provokes 
negative reactions to Black candidates among Whites. 73 Among the factors 
that seem to enhance such sentiments are the size of the Black population, 74 
the history of race relations in the community, and the salience of racial 
issues in the campaign. 75 
2. Gender and Voting 
Blatant and widespread discrimination among the electorate against 
female candidates has diminished considerably in recent years. 76 
Moreover, compared to race, gender has been a less divisive issue. 77 Some 
studies have found that voters harbor little bias against women; 78 and in 
some instances, women candidates may have an advantage over their male 
counterparts. 79 Once on the ballot, women are as successful as men at 
being elected into office. 80 
This is not to say that there are no gender divisions among the 
electorate. Since Ronald Reagan's first presidential term, a partisan gender 
gap has existed in national elections; women voters disproportionately 
favor Democratic candidates, and men generally lean toward 
Republicans. 81 Furthermore, women voters frequently favor Democratic 
Party policies. 82 However, this has not led candidates to engage in a 
gender analogue to race-baiting. 83 The reason for this may be that most 
successful women politicians are themselves people whose profiles are 
counter-stereotypical. As such, they do not seem as vulnerable to subtle 
efforts to invoke stereotypes. And there is no contemporary history of an 
analogous "Bradley Effect" in elections involving women. 84 The Bradley 
73. Carsey, supra note 71, at 222. 
74. V.O. KEy, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION 5 (Alfred A. Knopf ed., 
Vintage Books 1949) (indicating that Whites fear maintenance of control over Blacks where 
Blacks are a large part of the population). 
75. THOMAS F. PETIIGREW, Black Mayoral Campaigns, in URBAN GOVERNANCE AND 
MINORITIES 15 (Herrington J. Bryce ed., 1976); RAYMOND E. WOLFINGER, THE POLITICS OF 
PROGRESS 15 (\974). 
76. See, e.g., Carol Chaney & Barbara Sinclair, Women and the 1992 House 




79. See id. 
80. Leonie Huddy & Theresa Capelos, Gender Stereotyping and Candidate 
Evaluation: Good News and Bad News Jor Women Politicians, in THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 
OF POLITICS 30 (Victor C. Ottati et aI., eds., 2002). 
81. Id. 
82. See Mark Schlesinger & Caroline Heldman, Gender Gap or Gender Gaps?: New 
Perspectives on SupportJor Government Action Policies, 63 J. POL. 59, 73-83 (2001). 
83. See Parks & Rachlinski, supra note 2. 
84. See id. The Bradley Effect, named for former Mayor Tom Bradley of Los 
Angeles, is the tendency for polls to overestimate White support for a Black political 
candidate. Kent Jenkins, Jr. & R.B. Melton, Wilder Revels in His Triumph: Slim Margin 
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Effect, which has come to define Black politician electoral losses when 
wins are expected but wins by smaller margins than expected occur, is 
attributed to White voters lying to pollsters about who they are likely to 
vote for in elections where one candidate is Black and the other is White. 85 
Yet, scholars find that gender stereotyping linked to traditional sex-
roles still pervades electoral politics. 86 Experimental research by Leonie 
Huddy and Nayda Terkildsen, for example, finds that women candidates 
who demonstrate stereotypically female characteristics are at a great 
disadvantage. 87 Similarly, voters who prioritize issues such as terrorism, 
homeland security, and United States involvement in Iraq are more likely 
to believe that a man would better handle these issues as President. 88 
Furthermore, party leaders (who are as much aware of the stereotypes as 
researchers) focus primarily on finding winning candidates.89 Party leaders 
believe there is a greater tendency toward increased uncertainty over a 
woman's electability than a man's. 90 
C. RACE AND GENDER IN THE 2008 CAMPAIGN 
Gregory Parks and Jeffrey Rachlinski address the various ways in 
which race and gender have expressly manifested themselves in the 2008 
election. 91 Their research provides a great deal of context and nuance to 
this issue and connects these forms of bias in the campaign with Title VII 
case law. 92 Exit polls, however, provide the clearest and most concise 
indication of race and gender bias. 93 
As illustrated by the accompanying tables, blatant and express racial 
attitudes played a significant role in the 2008 presidential primary race. 94 
Table I demonstrates that in twenty-eight out of thirty-seven 
Puzzles Analysts, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 1989, at AI. 
85. See Patrick Reddy, Does McCall Have a Chance?: Yes, He Does, but African-
American Candidates for Top State Offices Face an Uphill Climb, BUFF. NEWS, Jan. 20, 
2002, at HI; Jenkins & Melton, supra note 84. 
86. Deborah Alexander & Kristi Andersen, Gender as a Factor in the Attributions of 
Leadership Traits, 46 POLl. REs. Q. 527 (1993); KATHLEEN A. DOLAN, VOTING FOR WOMEN: 
How THE PUBLIC EVALUATES WOMEN CANDIDATES 8, 9, 59-67 (2004); RICHARD LOGAN 
Fox, GENDER DYNAMICS IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 173-75 (1997); David Niven, Party 
Elites and Women Candidates: The Shape of Bias, 19 WOMEN & POL. 57, 75 (1998); Kira 
Sanbonmatsu, Gender Stereotypes and Vote Choice, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 20, 28-30 (2002). 
87. Leonie Huddy & Nayda Terkildsen, The Consequences of Gender Stereotypesfor 
Women Candidates at Different Levels and Types of Office, 46 POL. REs. Q. 503, 518 
(1993). 
88. Erika Falk & Kate Kenski, Issue Saliency and Gender Stereotypes: Support for 
Women in Times of War and Terrorism, 87 SOC. SCI. Q. I, 12 (2006). 
89. KIRA SANBONMATSU, WHERE WOMEN RUN: GENDER & PARTY IN THE AMERICAN 
STATES 3, 22, 26-30,37-86,97-115,118-19 (2006). 
90. Id. at 28-29. 
91. Parks & Rachlinski, supra note 2. 
92. !d. 
93. See app., tbl.l-2. 
94. See app., tb1.2. 
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primaries/caucuses for which we have exit poll data, Whites voted for Senator 
Clinton in higher numbers than for Senator Obama.95 Asian and Latino 
Americans also voted for Senator Clinton in higher numbers in eight out of 
eleven of those primaries/caucuses.96 Furthermore, as illustrated in Table 2, 
where voters indicated that race influenced their voting decisions, a higher 
percentage of individuals voted for Senator Clinton in sixteen states compared 
to twelve states for Senator Obarna.97 When we subtract from Senators 
Clinton's and Senator Obama's columns those states that they would likely 
have won due to their roots there Arkansas and New York for Clinton and 
Illinois for Obama - Senator Clinton still benefits. 98 This was most 
pronounced in West Virginia and Kentucky.99 Such preference of a White 
candidate over a Black candidate simply because of race implicates Title VII. 
As illustrated in Table I, in twenty-six out of thirty-seven 
primaries/caucuses for which we have exit poll data, men voted for Senator 
Obama in higher numbers than Senator Clinton. IOO As illustrated in Table 2, 
however, in states where voters indicated that gender was a deciding factor in 
their decision to cast their votes, only six out of twenty-nine went to Senator 
Obarna. 101 Among these states, one was Illinois, while the other five were 
states with sizeable Black populations. 102 These results suggest that though 
gender was a factor in the 2008 presidential primary campaign, it was not as 
large a factor as race. Openly acknowledged male support for Senator Obama, 
at least, seems to be complicated by home-state advantage and votes arising 
from racial solidarity. 103 
These fmdings are in a sense unremarkable. There is a lingering question 
that emanates from the 2008 Presidential Primary campaign: Are Americans 
more racist or more sexist?l04 Despite Gloria Steinem's assertion that "gender 
is probably the most restricting force in American life," at least in this section, 
the data suggest that race was more of a driving force. lOS Such findings 
amplifY those of Jeffrey Timberlake and Sarah Estes, who demonstrate that 
where race and gender are analyzed together - in particular with regard to 
stereotyping - race provides greater predictive power. 106 
95. App., tbLI. 
96. Jd. 
97. App., tbl.2. 
98.ld. 
99. !d. 
100. App., tbLL 
101. App., tbl.2. 
102. Id. 
103. Cf Kevin J. Flannelly, Voting for Female Candidates: Effects of Voters' Age, 
Ethnicity, and Gender, 142 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 397, 398 (2002). 
104. See Benjamin Wallace-Wells, Is America Too Racistfor Barack? Too Sexist for 
Hillary? WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 2006, at B I. 
105. Gloria Steinem, Op-Ed, Women Are Never Front-Runners, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 
2008, at 23A ("I'm not advocating a competition for who has it the toughest."). 
106. Jeffrey M. Timberlake & Sarah Beth Estes, Do Racial and Ethnic Stereotypes 
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D. INTERSECTIONALITY AND EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
Race and sex are two classifications on which a prima facie case of 
employment discrimination may be based. 107 Although color is yet another 
classification for a prima facie showing of employment discrimination, 108 
colorism claims (discrimination based upon gradations in skin color) are 
one example of the more complex race discrimination claims courts face. 109 
Racism (including colorism) and sexism are interconnected systems of 
discrimination and oppression. t 10 The juncture at which they intersect 
provides a fruitful and unique area of discrimination study. 1 t I 
A number of employment discrimination cases have wrangled with the 
intersection of race and gender, particularly regarding Black women. Some 
circuits fail to demonstrate an appreciation of this race-gender interaction. 
For example, in DeGraffenreid v. General Motors Assembly Div., five 
Black women sued their former employer charging, among other things, 
that the company's seniority system and "last hired-first fired" layoff 
policy was discriminatory. I 12 The plaintiffs sought to represent a class of 
exclusively Black women who were the victims of GM's alleged 
discrimination. 1I3 The Eighth Circuit held that the plaintiffs were not 
allowed to create a "super-remedy" by combining both race and sex 
discrimination. 114 In Payne v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc., Payne, a Black 
woman, and several other plaintiffs sued their employer for discrimination 
based on differential referrals of men and women to certain positions and 
the absence of Black employees above a certain level. 115 The Fifth Circuit 
Depend on the Sex of Target Group Members? EVidencefrom a Survey-Based Experiment, 
48 Soc. Q. 399, 419-20 (2007). 
107. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000). The statutory language expressly provides 
"[It]shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to fail or refuse to hire or 
to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect 
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 
108. /d. 
109. See, e.g., Taunya Lovell Banks, Colorism: A Darker Shade of Pale, 47 UCLA 
L. REV. 1705, 1724 (2000); see generally Leonard M. Baynes, If It's Not Just Black and 
White Anymore, Why Does Darkness Cast a Longer Discriminatory Shadow than 
Lightness? An Investigation and Analysis of the Color Hierarchy, 75 DENV. U. L. REv. 131 
(1997); Trina Jones, Shades of Brown: The Low of Skin Color, 49 DUKE LJ. 1487 (2000). 
110. See Caldwell, supra note 4, at 371-72 (stating, "[r]acism and sexism are 
mutually-reinforcing components of a system of dominance rooted in patriarchy."). 
Ill. Id. at 372 ("No significant and lasting progress in combating [racism or sexism] 
can be made until ... the perspectives gained from considering their interaction are reflected 
in legal theory and public policy."). 
112. DeGraffenreid v. Gen. Motors Assembly Div., 558 F.2d 480, 482 (8th Cir. 
1977). 
113. Id. 
114. DeGraffenreid, 558 F.2d at 483. The lower court similarly held that Title VII 
did not create a new sub-category of "Black women" with standing independent of Black 
men. See DeGraffenreid v. Gen. Motors Ass. Div., 413 F. Supp. 142, 145 (E.D. Mo. 1976). 
115. Payne v. Travenol Lab., Inc., 673 F.2d 798, 805 (5th Cir. 1982). 
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held that the interests of the Black women plaintiffs conflicted with 
those of Black men, since the plaintiffs attempted to prove that men 
were promoted at women's expense despite the court's finding of racial 
discrimination. 116 In Moore v. Hughes Helicopter, Inc., Moore, a Black 
woman, filed suit on behalf of a class of Black women employees 
alleging discrimination in the selection of employees for various labor 
grades and positions. 117 The Ninth Circuit upheld a district court 
decision refusing to allow Moore to represent either White women 
employees or Black male employees. 118 The Court of Appeals agreed 
with the lower court that Moore was an inadequate representative of 
white women employees, not because she did not claim sex 
discrimination, but rather because she was also Black. 119 Similarly, 
Moore was not allowed to represent Black male employees, not because 
she did not allege race discrimination but because she was also a 
woman. 120 
Other circuits, however, have acknowledged the realities of 
intersectionality. In Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mutual Hospital Insurance, 
Inc., Jenkins, a Black woman, sued her employer on her own behalf and 
on behalf of a class. 121 The suit alleged denial of promotion, better 
assignments, and ultimately termination for "race, sex, and black styles 
of hair and dress.,,122 After relying on Vuyanich v. Republic National 
Bank,123 the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff was eligible to 
represent a class of Blacks and women. 124 
In Jeffries v. Harris County Community Action Assoc., Jefferies, a 
Black woman, sued her employer on the grounds that during the nearly 
four years she was employed, she failed to receive any promotions. 125 
When she applied for a field representative position during her fourth 
year with the company, a Black man was promoted over her.126 In 
looking to the specific language of Title VII,127 the Fifth Circuit 
116. Payne, 673 F.2d at 810-12. 
117. Moore v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 708 F.2d 475 (9th Cir. 1982). 
118. Id. at 480. 
119. /d. 
120. /d. 
121. Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 538 F.2d 164, 165 (7th Cir. 1976). 
122. /d. 
123. Vuyanich v. Republic National Bank, 409 F, Supp 1083, 1089 (N,D, Tex. 1976) 
(holding that the plaintiff could sue on race and gender inasmuch as her superior told her 
that she (a Black woman) "probably did not need a job anyway, because her husband was a 
Caucasian," since that statement discriminated against both Blacks and women, as it could 
not be made to either a white person or a male), 
124. Jenkins, 538 F,2d at 169. 
125, Jeffiies v. Harris County Cmty, Action Ass'n, 615 F,2d 1025, 1029 (5th Cir. 1980). 
126. Jeffries, 615 F.2d at 1029, 
127. 42 U,S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000). Title VII provides a remedy against employ-
ment discrimination based upon an employee's "race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin." (emphasis added by authors). 
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construed "or" to imply congressional "intent to prohibit employment 
discrimination based on any or all of the listed characteristics." 128 
E. THE RACE/GENDER NEXUS AND MICHELLE OBAMA 
Political science and legal scholarship illustrates two important 
challenges for Michelle Obama. With regard to gender, a significant 
challenge for Mrs. Obama is to not wield too much power or influence. 
As much progress as women have made in electoral politics, the role of 
First Lady has evolved more slowly.129 Historically, First Ladies have 
served conventional roles. Not only did they serve as the official hosts 
to the White House,130 they also reached out to women during their 
husbands' campaigns. 131 In addition, they served as a liaison between 
the White House and women's organizations 132 and promoted the 
administration's women-oriented programs and policies. 133 However, 
First Ladies are now faced with the paradox of traditional, aristocratic 
demands that they act like "ladies" and more modern demands that they 
be models of social concern and actively involved in the political 
agenda. 134 Failure to conform to these constrained gender roles incites 
critical media reaction. 135 In other words, the more politically active the 
First Lady, the more negative press coverage she receives.136 Being 
outspoken and recognized for her critical role in her husband's 
campaign, voter attitudes towards Michelle Obama were likely 
influenced by gender. 
With regard to race, Mrs. Obama may be perceived as "too Black." 
To some degree, this idea may be taken literally. People have long held 
more negative attitudes towards darker-skinned Blacks vis-a.-vis those 
who are fairer-skinned. 137 For instance, light-skinned Blacks are 
perceived as more attractive than dark-skinned Blacks, which is 
particularly true in the case of Black women. 138 As such, Black 
128. Jeffries, 615 F.2d at 1032 .. 
129. Erica Scharrer & Kim Bissell, Overcoming Traditional Boundaries: The Role of 
Political Activity in Media Coverage of First Ladies, 21 WOMEN & POL. 55, 56 (2000). 
130. See generally Edith P. Mayo, Party Politics: The Political Impact of the First 
Ladies' Social Role, 37 Soc. SCI. J. 577 (2000). 
131. See Jill Abraham Hummer, First Ladies and American Women: Representation 
and the Modem Presidency (May 2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Virginia) (on file with Hastings Women's Law Journal). 
132. See id. at 137-218. 
133. See id. at 219-63. 
134. See Wekkin, supra note 11, at 601-08. 
135. Betty Houchin Winfield, "Madame President"; Understanding a New Kind of 
First Lady, 8 MEOlA STUD. 1. 59,61 (1994). 
136. Scharrer & Bissell, supra note 129, at 69-74. 
137. See generally Banks, supra note 109, at 1714-24; see also Jones, supra note 
109. 
138. Mark E. Hill, Skin Color and the Perception of Attractiveness Among African 
Americans: Does Gender Make a Difference?, 65 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 77, 83-86 (2002). 
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women's closer approximation to Whiteness is deemed to be a 
particularly feminine characteristic among Blacks 139 and may be so 
among Whites as well. Similarly, intersectionality affects Whites' 
perception process, which leads to gender categorization errors for 
Black women. 140 Consequently, "Blackness" and "maleness" are highly 
associated for Black men and women. 141 Furthermore, women are 
deemed as unattractive commensurate with their perceived masculinity, 
leading Whites to rate Black women as less attractive than other 
women. 142 More fitting, however, is a less literal and more 
philosophical assessment of Michelle Obama' s blackness. Blacks who 
downplay their race and attempt to assimilate with the larger White 
society are deemed to be less threatening by Whites than those who 
assimilate less. 143 Furthermore, Blacks who assimilate more are, in 
turn, viewed as "good Blacks" by Whites. l44 Preference for a White 
over Black is neither a dichotomous issue nor a simple matter of skin 
color. Perceptions about a Black person's racial ideology, on a 
continuum, may also provoke discrimination. In the employment 
context, for example, Gordon v. JKP Enterprises, Inc. held that a Black 
plaintiff was discriminated against by her employer for being "too 
ethnic" or "pro-Black." 145 Thus, because she has been more pointed 
about racial issues (or at least more so than Senator Obama) voters' 
negative attitudes about Mrs. Obama may be largely influenced by race. 
Much research on discrimination has focused separately on the 
effects of race or gender, ignoring the reality that Black women must 
deal with the joint effects of dual minority statuses, originally termed 
"double jeopardy." 146 Interactive models utilize the concept of 
"multiple jeopardy," further accounting for Black women's unique 
social location at the intersection of many different status hierarchies 
(including race, gender, and class), which produces experiences distinct 
from those of White women. 147 Such models highlight the challenges 
139. Hill, supra note 138, at 80. 
140. See generally Phillip Atiba Goff et aI., "Ain't I a Woman?": Towards an 
Intersectional Approach to Person Perception and Group-based Harms, 59 SEX ROLES 392 
(2008). 
141. !d. at 397-401. 
142.ld. 
143. Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The Admission of Legacy Blacks, 60 VAND. L. REv. 
1141, 1164 (2007). 
144. Id.; Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Volunteer Discrimination, 40 V.C. DAVIS L. REv. 
1895,1899 (2007). 
145. Gordon v. JKP Enter. Inc., No. 01-20420, 2002 WL 753496, at *1, *10 (5th Cir. 
April 9, 2002). 
146. FRANCIS BEALE, Double Jeopardy: To be Black and Female, in THE BLACK 
WOMAN: AN ANTHOLOGY 111-114 (Toni Cade, ed., 1970). 
147. Deborah K. King, Multiple Jeopardy, Multiple Consciousness: The Context ofa 
Black Feminist Ideology, 14 SIGNS 42-72 (1988). 
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faced by Michelle Obama. Specifically, the intersection of Michelle 
Obama's racial and gender identity and politics - discussing issues of 
race, critiquing her husband openly and honestly, and discussing work-
family balance for women - could ultimately leave voters fearing that 
she is an "angry Black woman" 148 or wondering and critiqu~ng, "Why is 
she so womanish?" 149 
III. IMPLICIT BIAS AND VOTERIEMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION 
Undeniably, Americans have made tremendous progress with regards 
to attitudes about race and gender in the past several decades. This 
progress, however, has occurred primarily at a surface level within society. 
Research on implicit attitudes, which are judgments that are automatically 
activated without a person's awareness or intention, ISO suggests that 
negative, stereotypical attitudes about Blacks and women are still 
pervasive. These attitudes are evidenced in both voting and employment 
decisions. 
A. IMPLICIT ATTITUDES 
People's reports of their cognitive processes are often not consistent 
with their judgments. 151 Many influences on judgment seem to operate 
outside of people's awareness. 152 Combining this observation with 
contemporary research on thought processing, psychologists now argue that 
people rely on parallel cognitive systems of judgment: one is rapid, 
intuitive, and unconscious; the other is slow, deductive, and deliberative. 153 
The intuitive system often dictates choice, with the deductive system 
lagging behind, struggling to produce reasons for a choice that comports 
148. See Erica Chito Childs, Looking Behind the Stereotypes of the "'Angry Black 
Woman ": An Exploration of Black Women's Responses to Interracial Relationships, 19 
GENDER & SOC'y 544 (2005); see also Verdict: Beat the Press, Fox News Host Discusses 
"'Angry Black Women" (MSNBC television broadcast June 16, 2008), available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.coml2008/06/17/fox-news-host-discusses-a_n_107526.html. 
149. See Katrice Annette Albert, Why Is She So Womanish?: The Relationship 
Between Racial Identity Attitudes and Womanist Identity Attitudes in African American 
College Women (August 2002) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Auburn University) (on file 
with Hastings Women's Law Journal). The term "womanist" is a synonym for black 
feminist or feminist of color. See ALICE WALKER, IN SEARCH OF OUR MOTHERS' GARDENS: 
WOMANISTPROSE xi-xii (1983). 
150. Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social Cognition: 
Attitudes, Self-Esteem and Stereotypes. 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4-5 (1995). 
151. See, e.g., Timothy D. Wilson & Richard E. Nisbett, The Accuracy of Verbal 
Reports about the Effects of Stimuli on Evaluations and Behavior, 41 Soc. PSYCHOL. 118, 
121-23,125,127 (1978). 
152. See id. 
153. See Chris Guthrie et aI., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 
CORNELL L. REv. 1,6-9 (2007) (reviewing this literature). 
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with the accessible parts of memory. 154 Thus, an intuitive, gut reaction 
against a candidate can dictate choice. The rational account follows later 
and might not provide a fully accurate account of the decision. 
Research on implicit bias indicates that race and gender biases can 
influence unconscious, emotional processes, wholly apart from the 
conscious, rational ones. 155 Psychologists term these unconscious, 
emotional influences "implicit biases"- attitudes or thoughts that people 
hold but might not explicitly endorse. 156 These attitudes might conflict 
with expressly held values or beliefs. Many people who embrace the 
egalitarian norm that skin color should not affect their judgment of a job or 
political candidate also unwittingly harbor negative associations about 
minorities. 157 People might not even be aware that they hold these 
attitudes. 158 Even so, these implicit cognitions influence how people 
evaluate others. 159 The implicit cognitive processes might heavily 
influence the final choice of a voter who does not otherwise clearly 
embrace one candidate over another. 160 
Over the last ten years, psychologists have identified ways to measure 
implicit cognitions. These methods have proven to be particularly useful 
for studying bias against Blacks or stereotypes about women. This is so for 
two key reasons. First, when explicit measures are used, individuals may 
not reveal their true attitudes or preferences because of social desirability 
biases, thus not elucidating the actual magnitude of the relationship that 
would exist between attitudes and, for example, political outcomes. 161 The 
second comparative advantage is that individuals may not even be aware of 
their true preferences or attitudes and thus cannot report them if asked. 162 
The Implicit Association Test ("IA T") has rapidly become the most 
154. See Guthrie et al., supra note 153. 
ISS. See Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific 
Foundations, 94 CAL. L. REv 945, 951 (2006). 
156. Greenwald & Banaji, supra note 150 at 4-5; see also Brian A. Noesk et aI., The 
Implicit Association Test at Age 7: A Methodological and Conceptual Review, in SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY AND THE UNCONSCIOUS: THE AUTOMATICITY OF HIGHER MENTAL PROCESSES 
265-267 (John A. Bargh cd., 2007). 
157. See Andrew Scott Baron & Mahzarin R. Banaji, The Development of Implicit 
Attitudes: Evidence of Race Evaluations from Age 6 and 10 and Adulthood, 17 PSYCHOL. 
SCI. 53, 55-56 (2006); Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 155, at 951. 
158. Greenwald & Banaji, supra note 150, at 4-5 (1995). 
159. See Anthony G. Greenwald et aI., Understanding and Using the Implicit 
Association Test: 1II. Meta-Analysis of Predictive Validity, 4 (October 12, 2007) 
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the J. PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL.); Kristin A. 
Lane et aI., Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3 ANN. REv. L. Soc. SCI. 427, 435-37 (2007) 
(reviewing evidence that the implicit social cognition predicts behavior). 
160. See infra notes 165 to 227 and accompanying text. 
161. Cindy D. Kam, Implicit Attitudes. Explicit Choices: When Subliminal Priming 
Predicts Candidate Preference, 29 POL. BEHAV. 343, 345 (2007). 
162. Kam, supra note 161, at 345. 
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widely used measure of implicit bias. 163 The IA T is a procedure that seeks 
to assess latent attitudes by measuring their underlying automatic 
evaluation. l64 Using cognitive priming procedures, it measures the relative 
strength of associations between pairs of concepts to determine automatic 
affect or attitude. In the initial IA T task, participants are required to 
separate different images into categories (e.g., race, gender, weight, etc.). 
Next, participants are required to sort different attributes as pleasant or 
unpleasant in meaning. In the next steps, the images and attributes are 
superimposed, pairing images with closely associated and not-so-closely 
associated attributes. The more closely associated two concepts are, the 
easier it is to respond to them as a pair. Thus, the IAT measures relative 
strength of associations between targets and certain attributes based on the 
difficulty (Le., response time) of the sorting process. 
1. Race 
Research on the IAT, which pairs White and Black faces with positive 
and negative words, shows that roughly seventy percent of Whites harbor 
anti-BlackJpro-White biases. 165 Web-based IAT samples with thousands of 
participants reveal strong biases with several characteristics: People 
associate light skin with good and dark skin with bad; 166 White faces with 
harmless objects and Black faces with weapons. 167 The proper 
interpretation of these results has been a matter of some debate,168 but most 
scholars conclude that the IAT can measure implicit biases. 169 
A study by Leslie Ashburn-Nardo and colleagues shows just how 
broad-based implicit biases can be. In this study, participants found it 
easier to associate their in-group (i.e., American names) with pleasant 
words and the out-group (i.e., Surinamese names) with unpleasant words 
than they found it to make reverse pairings, even though participants lacked 
experience with Suriname. 170 Even with equally unfamiliar exemplars for 
both in-group and out-group, they nevertheless displayed a pro-in-group 
163. See Lane et aL, supra note 159, at 430 (noting that techniques that assess 
response times are the most widely used methods for ascertaining implicit attitudes). 
164. See Greenwald & Banaji, supra note 150, at 4-5. 
165. Brian A. Nosek, et aL, Pervasiveness and Correlates oj Implicit Attitudes and 
Stereotypes, 18 EUR. REv. Soc. PSYCHOL. 36, 45 (2007). 
166. Kristin A. Lane, et aI., Understanding and Using the Implicit Association Test: IV: 
What We Know So Far About the Method, in IMPLICT MEASURES OF ATTITUDES 62-67 (Bernd 
Wittenbrink & Norbert Schwarz eds., 2007). 
167. B. Keith Payne, Prejudice and Perception: The Role oj Automatic and Controlled 
Processes in Misperceiving a Weapon, 81 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 181, 183-86, 188 
(2001). 
168. See Hal R. Arkes & Philip E. TeUock, Attributions oj Implicit Prejudice, or 
"Would Jesse Jackson 'Fail' the IAT?," 15 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 257, 260-61 (2004). 
169. Lane et aI., supra note 166, at 72, 91. 
170. Leslie Ashburn-Nardo et aI., Implicit Associations as the Seeds oj Intergroup 
Bias: How Easily Do They Take Root?, 81 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 789, 792 (2001). 
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IAT bias. Thus, even with only minimal experiential or historical input, 
peoples' minds are prepared to display bias effortlessly. 171 
A study by Thierry Devos and Mahzarin Banaji found that individuals 
make no distinction between Blacks and Whites on explicit measures of 
"Americanness.,,172 On implicit measures, however, participants more 
easily paired American symbols with White faces than with Black faces. 173 
In a second study, Devos and Banaji used photos of eight Black and eight 
White United States track and field athletes who participated in the 2000 
Olympics, 174 The assumption was that Blacks who represented their 
country in the Olympics should appear more American than those who did 
not. 175 On the measure of familiarity, participants reported being more 
familiar with Black athletes than with White athletes. '76 Taking the two 
explicit self-report measures together, participants were both more familiar 
with Black than White athletes and reported a stronger association between 
Black athletes and American than White athletes and American. 177 On the 
IAT, however, the reverse was found, with White athletes being more 
strongly associated with the category "American" than Black athletes. 178 
White and Asian Americans associated Whites with the concept 
"American" to a greater extent than Blacks. 179 Furthermore, in a study by 
Melissa Ferguson and colleagues, they found that when Whites and Asians 
were primed with the American flag (shown subliminal images), their 
attitudes toward Blacks become even more negative,I80 
A study by Phillip Goff and colleagues investigated the relationship 
between implicit racial attitudes and dehumanization of Blacks. In their 
first study, individuals were subliminally shown images of Black faces, 
White faces, or neutral images. 181 Then they were shown fuzzy images of 
171. See Ashburn-Nardo, supra note 170, at 794-95. See also Nilanjana Dasgupta et 
aI., Automatic Preference for White Americans: Eliminating the Familiarity Explanation, 36 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 316,321-23 (2000) (fmding that positive attributes were more 
strongly associated with White than Black Americans even when: (a) pictures of equally 
unfamiliar Black and White individuals were used as stimuli; and (b) differences in stimulus 
familiarity were statistically controlled). 
172. Thierry Devos & Mahzarin R. Banaji, American = White, 88 J. PERSONALITY & 






178. Id. at 455. 
179. Id. at 459. 
180. Melissa J. Ferguson et aI., The American Flag Increases Prejudice Toward 
African-Americans, 4-28 (unpublished rnanuscript)( on file with authors). 
181. Phillip Atiba Goff et aI., Not Yet Human: Implicit Knowledge. Historical 
Dehumanization. and Contemporary Consequences, 94 J. PERSONALITY & SoC. PSYCHOL. 
292, 294 (2008). 
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animals (apes and non-apes), which gradually became clearer. 182 
Individuals were instructed to indicate the point at which they could 
identify the image. 183 Goff and colleagues found that both Whites and non-
Whites more quickly associated Blacks, as compared to Whites, with 
apes. 184 In a second study, individuals were first subliminally shown 
images of ape line drawings or jumbled line drawings. 185 Second, they 
were given a facial interference task designed to gauge how distracted 
participants would become when presented with faces prior to a test 
measuring their attentional bias to Black and White faces. 186 Their results 
indicated that priming individuals with images of apes demonstrated more 
attentional bias towards Black faces. 18? Moreover, Goff and colleagues 
found that implicit anti-Black biases predicted this ape-Black 
association. 188 
These biases generally begin at an early age. Baron and Banaji 
assessed White American six-year-olds, ten-year-olds, and adults using a 
child-oriented version of the lAT. Remarkably, even the youngest group 
showed implicit pro-White/anti-Black bias, with self-reported attitudes 
revealing bias in the same direction. 189 The ten-year-olds and adults 
showed the same magnitude of implicit race bias, but self-reported racial 
attitudes became substantially less biased in older children and vanished 
entirely in adults, who self-reported equally favorable attitudes toward 
Whites and Blacks. 190 It seems that people learn bias early but only later 
learn to cover the bias by publicly embracing more egalitarian nonns. 
The latter point shows the striking divergence between explicit 
attitudes towards race and measures of implicit bias. 191 Although explicit 
and implicit measures of bias are related, even people who openly embrace 
egalitarian nonns often harbor very negative associations concerning 
Blacks. 192 Even participants who are told that the TAT measures 
undesirable racist attitudes and who explicitly self-report egalitarian 
attitudes find it difficult to control their biased responses. 193 These 
findings suggest that the explicit and implicit studies measure somewhat 
182. Goffet aI., supra note 181, at 295. 
183. Id. 
184. ld. at 296. 
185. !d. at 297. 
186. Id. 
187. Id. at 298-99. 
188. Id. at 30 l. 
189. Baron & Banaji, supra note 157, at 55. 
190. Id. at 56. 
191. See Lane et aI., supra note 166. 
192. See generally Baron & Banaji, supra note 156 (indicating that whereas 
seemingly egalitarian views about race emerge over time, implicit racial attitudes stay the 
same). 
193. Do-Yeong Kim, Voluntary Controllability of the Implicit Association Test, 66 
Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 83, 92 (2003). 
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different cognitive systems. The explicit measures show that most adults 
have learned the importance of egalitarian norms - or at least the 
importance of embracing such norms publicly. 
2. Gender 
The research on implicit bias also indicates that most people hold 
implicit biases about gender. People misattribute high status more readily 
to unknown men than to unknown women. 194 They associate "male" with 
"hierarchical" and "female" with "egalitarian" 195 and evaluate male 
authority figures more favorably than their female counterparts. 196 Priming 
people to think about dependence or aggression influences their judgments 
of men and women. They judge women, but not men, as more dependent 
while thinking about dependence and judge men, but not women, as more 
aggressive while thinking about aggression. 197 Men also automatically 
associate maleness with power. 198 
Not surprisingly, these attitudes towards men and women translate 
directly into evaluations of potential careers. Web-based IA T studies 
reveal that people more closely associate men with science and women 
with humanities. 199 People more easily associate "engineer" with men and 
"elementary school teacher" with women than the opposite pairing. 2OO In 
one study, participants primed with words associated with historically male 
roles (like "doctor") tended to categorize a subsequent gender-neutral 
pronoun as being male, while participants primed with words associated 
with historically female roles (like "nurse") tended to categorize a 
subsequent gender-neutral pronoun as being female. 201 Like studies of 
racial bias, even participants who explicitly reject gender-based stereotypes 
concerning careers carry these implicit biases. 202 Web-based IA T studies 
194. See generally Mahzarin R. Banaji & Anthony G. Greenwald, implicit Gender 
Stereotyping in Judgments of Fame, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 181, 185-86, 189, 
190-91,192-93 (\995). 
195. Marianne Schmid Mast, Men Are Hierarchical, Women Are Egalitarian: An 
implicit Gender Stereotype, 63 SWISS J. PSYCHOL. 107, 109-10 (2004). 
196. Laurie A. Rudman & Stephen E. Kilianski, implicit and Explicit Attitudes 
Toward Female Authority, 26 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1315, 1319-24 (2000). 
197. Mahzarin R. Banaji et aL, implicit Stereotyping in Person Judgment, 65 J. 
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 272,275-76 (1993). 
198. Laurie A. Rudman et aI., Implicit Self-concept and Evaluative implicit Gender 
Stereotypes: Self and ingroup Share Desirable Traits, 27 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 1164, 1167-68 (2001). 
199. Brian A. Nosek et al., Harvesting implicit Group Attitudes and Beliefs From a 
Demonstration Web Site, 6 GROUP DYNAMICS: THEORY, REs. & PRACTICE 101, 105, 107-08 
(2002). 
200. Michael J. White & Gwendolen B. White, implicit and Explicit Occupational 
Gender Stereotypes, 55 SEX ROLES 259, 263-64 (2006). 
201. Mahzarin R. Banaji & Curtis D. Hardin, Automatic Stereotyping, 7 PSYCHOL. 
SCI. 136, 136-139 (1996). 
202. ld. at 138-39. 
Winter 2009] MICHELLE OBAMA 25 
also reveal that both men and women tend to link "male" with "career" and 
"female" with "family."z03 Among men, this connection is consistent with 
their explicit statements about gender stereotypes, although women 
explicitly reject such connections as inconsistent with their beliefs. Z04 
Like implicit race biases, many of the associations involving gender 
cast men in a more favorable light. However, the relationship involving 
gender is somewhat more complicated. Women reveal a strong automatic 
preference for female words (e.g., "her" or "she") over male words (e.g., 
"him" or "he"), whereas men harbor no preference.2os Moreover, women's 
automatic in-group bias is much stronger than men's in-group bias, 
although this tendency is most pronounced among women who have 
positive self-esteem. 206 Rudman and Greenwald captured the essence of 
this phenomenon with two phrases characterizing women and men, 
respectively: "If I am good and I am female, females are good," and "Even 
if I am good and I am male, men are not necessarily good.,,207 Rudman and 
Greenwald also discovered, in two other studies, that individuals harbor a 
pro-female bias to the extent that they favor their mothers over their 
fathers 208 and associate maleness with violence, all at the implicit level. 209 
B. IMPLICIT BIAS AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES/BEHA VIOR 
Research has shown that implicit attitudes influence prejudice and 
intergroup discrimination in a variety of contexts, ZIO including voting 
processes. Social scientists who have failed to find racial polarization in 
voters' candidate preferences have readily acknowledged "covert 
racism"ZII or voter "misreporting,,21Z as explanations for why they failed to 
detect results in their studies. Research on implicit bias and political 
attitudes and behavior, however, seems to provide a better link between 
203. Nosek et aI., supra note 199, at 105, 108-09. 
204. /d. at 109. 
205. Eugene V. Aidman & Steve M. Carroll, Implicit Individual Differences: 
Relationships Between Implicit Self-Esteem, Gender Identity, and Gender Attitudes, 17 EUR. 
J. PERSONALITY 19,27-28 (2003). 
206. Laurie A. Rudman & Stephenie A. Goodwin, Gender Differences in Automatic 
In-Group Bias: Why Do Women Like Women More Than Men Like Men?, 87 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 494, 497-98 (2004). 
207. Id. at 498. 
208. /d. at 500-01. 
209. Id. at 502-03. 
210. John F., Dovidio et aI., On the Nature of Prejudice: Automatic and Controlled 
Processes, 33 1. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 510, 510-40 (2001); Allen R. McConnell & 
Jill M. Leibold., Relations Among the Implicit Association Test, Discriminatory Behavior, 
and Explicit Measures of Racial Attitudes, 37 1. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL., 435, 435-42 
(2001). 
211. Jack Citrin et aI., White Reactions to Black Candidates: When Does Race 
Matter?, 54 PuB. OPINION Q. 74, 92 (1990). 
212. Benjamin Highton, White Voters and African American Candidates for 
Congress, 26 POL. BEHAV. 1, 11-12 (2004). 
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people's racial attitudes and their voting behavior. For example, people 
who endorse right-of-center political views also tend to associate Black 
with bad and White with good on the IAT.213 Similarly, political 
conservatism is associated with White in-group favoritism on both implicit 
and explicit measures.214 
Implicit attitudes affect how people vote. 215 In one study, Karn 
examined the impact of an implicit measure of attitudes towards an ethnic 
group on citizens' willingness to support a minority candidate.216 She either 
identified the candidates' party affiliations or omitted that information. 217 
Karn found that for the implicit measure, Democrats who held the most 
favorable views towards Hispanics were nearly four times as likely to prefer 
the Hispanic candidate compared with their counterparts who held the least 
positive implicit views towards Hispanics. 218 Implicit measures of attitudes 
towards Hispanics were much less relevant when party cues were available, 
however. 219 Even participants who expressed highly negative implicit 
attitudes towards Hispanics nevertheless voted for Hispanic candidates 
identified as being from the political party that they favor. 22o This suggests 
that Democrats can overcome their implicit biases in an effort to vote for a 
Democrat regardless of race. This theory, however, may only extend to 
minority candidates who are not Black -assuming Whites harbor more 
animosity toward Blacks than other racial minorities. 
Recent, unpublished research by Albertson and Greenwald links implicit 
attitudes with the Bradley Effect. 221 Their study (conducted before the 2008 
primaries began) measured both implicit and explicit preferences by voters 
for three Democratic hopefuls Clinton, Edwards, and Obarna. When 
voters were asked whom they supported, Obarna won handily, forty-two 
213. William A. Cunningham et aI., Implicit and Explicit Ethnocentrism: Revisiting 
the Ideologies of Prejudice, 30 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1332, 1336 (2004). 
214. 10hn T. lost et aI., A Decade of System Justification Theory: Accumulated 
Evidence of Conscious and Unconscious Bolstering of the Status Quo, 25 POL. PSYCHOL. 
881,902 (2004); Brian Nosek, The Politics ofIntergroup Attitudes: Implicit Cognition and 
Political Orientation, Presentation at Duke University's The Psychology of Voting and 
Election Campaigns (Oct. 20-21,2006). 
215. See Inna Burdein et aI., Experiments on the Automaticity of Political Beliefo and 
Attitudes, 27 POL. PSYCHOL. 359 (2006); Malte Friese et aI., Predicting Voting Behavior 
with Implicit Attitude Measures: The 2002 German Parliamentary Election, 54 
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 248,251 (2007) (finding predictive power of the IAT in the 2002 
German Parliamentary election); see generally WESTEN, supra note 56, at 219-48. 





221. ScientificBlogging.com, Implicit Association Test Creator Says Political Polls 
Need Better Metrics to be More Accurate, http://www.scientificblogging.comlnews_releases 
limplicit_association_tesCcreatocsays_political-polls_need_better_metrics_to_be_accurate 
(last visited November I, 2008). 
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percent to thirty-four percent and twelve percent for Clinton and Edwards, 
respectively.222 But Obama came in third, with twenty-five percent on 
implicit measures, with Clinton and Edwards capturing forty-eight percent 
and twenty-seven percent of the participants' support. 223 This study, while 
preliminary, provides the most direct evidence that Senator Obama faces a 
gap between what voters will tell pollsters and how they will vote. 
Other research has explored the implicit association between the 
categories of White and American in the 2008 election.224 Devos and 
colleagues found that people more easily associated Senator Clinton and 
even Tony Blair with the category "American" than they did Senator 
Obama. 225 In another study by Melissa Ferguson and colleagues, when 
Whites and Asians were primed with images of the American flag, their 
attitudes toward Democrats were not altered, but their attitudes toward 
Blacks generally, and Senator Obama specifically, became more 
negative.226 In fact, when primed with the American flag, eligible voters 
(i.e., college students) were less inclined to vote for Senator Obama over 
other candidates. 227 
C. IMPLICIT ATTITUDES AND EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
In recent years, implicit bias has been imported into legal scholarship. 
The role of implicit bias in employment discrimination was advanced by 
Linda Hamilton Krieger almost a decade and a half ago. In her seminal 
work, Krieger presented three broad ideas. First, stereotyping is not 
intent-driven but evolves from social cognition theory, which assumes 
that, quite naturally, "cognitive structures and processes involved in 
categorization and information processing can in and of themselves result 
in stereotyping and other forms of biased intergroup judgment previously 
attributed to motivational processes."m Furthermore, it is not only "bad" 
people who stereotype; as part of "normal cognitive functioning," all 
people categorize and stereotype natural objects as a way "to simplify the 
task of perceiving, processing, and retaining information about people in 
memory.,,229 Second, stereotypes unintentionally bias people's 
judgment about members of other groups. 230 Third, stereotypes are 
222. ScientificBlogging.com, supra note 221. 
223. Id. 
224. Devos & Banaji, supra note 172. 
225. Thierry Devos et aI., Is Barack Obama American Enough to be the Next 
President? The Role of Racial and National Identity in American Politics, available at 
http://www.rohan.sdsu.eduHdevos/thdlDevos_spsp2008.pdf. 
226. Ferguson, supra note 180, at 9. 
227. !d. at 8-12. 
228. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias 
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1161, 
1187 (1995). 
229. Krieger, supra note 228, at 1188. 
230. !d. 
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triggered and operate outside of one's own conscious awareness. 231 
Krieger, in turn, applied these principles to the area of Title VII 
jurisprudence. Her contention and critique revolved around certain 
assumptions that Title VII cases make about human inference and 
judgment. The first erroneous assumption is that discriminatory 
motive or intent drives intergroup discrimination. 232 Currently, under 
Title VII, a disparate treatment plaintiff must prove that purposeful or 
intentional di scrimination resulted in differential treatment. 233 In the 
context of race, discrimination results from the decision-maker's racial 
animus toward members of plaintiff's racial group.234 Few Title VII 
cases acknowledge unconscious race bias,235 whereas cases have 
acknowledged the role of unconscious gender stereotyping. 236 Krieger 
argues that there is a logical connection between implicit biases and 
intentional discrimination in three ways. First, stereotypes bias 
decision making through the conscious use of race and sex as a proxy 
for some other characteristic stereotypically associated with group 
membership. 231 Second, evidence of stereotyping suggests 
231. Krieger, supra note 228, at 1188. 
232. /d. at 1166-67. 
233. See, e.g., St Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,506-07 (1993) ("[The 
plaintiff has] the ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim of 
intentional discrimination.") (quoting Tex. Dep't of Cmty Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 
256 (1981)). Accord EEOC v. Flasher Co., 986 F.2d 1312, 1314 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding 
that plaintiff had to prove termination of employment was the result of intentional 
discrimination based on plaintiffs national origin); Warren v. Halstead Indus., Inc., 802 
F.2d 746, 752-53 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding discriminatory intent means actual motive and 
cannot be presumed based upon a factual showing of less than actual motive); Smith v. 
Honeywell, Inc., 735 F.2d 1067, 1068-69 (8th Cir. 1984) (holding that an individual 
alleging disparate treatment has the burden of showing not only a difference in treatment, 
but that he is a victim of intentional discrimination), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1077 (1984); 
Smithers v. Bailar, 629 F.2d 892, 898 (3d Cir. 1980) (holding disparate treatment plaintiff is 
required to prove not only disparate treatment, but that such disparate treatment was caused 
by purposeful or intentional discrimination). 
234. See EEOC v. Flasher Co., 986 F.2d 1312, 1321 (10th Cir. 1992) ("Merely 
finding that people have been treated differently stops short of the crucial question: why 
people have been treated differently."); Minority Police Officers Ass'n v. City of S. Bend, 
617 F. Supp. 1330, 1358 (N.D. Ind. 1985) ("Mere conclusory allegations of discrimination 
are clearly not sufficient to prove discriminatory intent."); Gomez v. Med. Coli., No. 92-
5048, 1994 U.S. Dist LEXIS 11274, ·9 (E.D. Pa. 1994) ("A plaintiff may not prevail on a 
mere showing that the defendant's proffered reasons are false, but must prove a 
discriminatory animus."). 
235. But see EEOC v. Inland Marine Indus., 729 F.2d 1229, 1236 (9th Cir. 1984) 
(holding that racial discrimination occurs where subjective employment criteria embody 
racially discriminatory attitudes, even where intent is not established), cerro denied sub nom. 
Inland Marine Indus. v. Houston, 469 U.S. 855 (1984). 
236. See, e.g., Sweeney v. Bd. of Treasurers of Keene State Coli., 604 F.2d 106, 113 
n.12 (1st Cir. 1979) (affirming judgment for plaintiff in sex discrimination case because the 
district court could have reasonably concluded that the decision not to promote plaintiff was 
"determined by a subtle, if unexpressed, bias against women."). 
237. Krieger, supra note 228, at 1173. Cases in which plaintiffs have prevailed 
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discriminatory intent if stereotypes are understood as one's 
expectations about how members of a particular group should 
behave. 238 Third, statements reflecting stereotyped views represent 
discriminatory animus, where discrimination is seen as resulting from 
prejudice where prejudice consists of "a cognitive component 
(stereotypes), an affective component (aversion or dislike), and a 
behavioral component (discrimination aimed at creating or enforcing 
social distance).,,239 
The second erroneous assumption is that unless employers harbor 
discriminatory intent or motive, they will be rational actors. 240 As 
such, proving discriminatory intent in the employment context is a 
high hurdle to overcome. 241 Under the analytical framework estab-
lished by Texas Dep 'f of Community Affairs v. Burdine and McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green, proof of disparate treatment is evinced in 
three steps. First, pretext analysis begins when the plaintiff presents a 
prima facie case of discrimination. 242 In response, the defendant has 
the burden of producing legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons to 
justify the adverse employment action against the plaintiff. 243 Second, 
the plaintiff can prevail only by proving that the defendant's proffered 
reason was not the "true reason" for the decision,244 but merely a 
"pretext for discrimination.,,245 According to Krieger's research: 
[T]he most common method of proving pretext is to show that 
the employer's proffered reason is not worthy of credence 
either because it appears implausible in light of data upon 
which such an employment decision should have been based, 
or because it appears inconsistent with decisions reached in 
similar cases involving employees outside of plaintiffs 
protected class. 246 
under this theory are more frequently seen in the age, vis-ii-vis race, context. See, e.g., 
Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 611 (1993) ("The employer cannot rely on age as 
a proxy for an employee's remaining characteristics, such as productivity, but must instead 
focus on those factors directly."). 
238. Krieger, supra note 228, at 1173. 
239. Id. at 1174. 
240. Id. at 1167. 
241. See Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 697 (7th Cir. 1987) (indicating that 
"[p ]roof of such discrimination is always difficult"). 
242. See Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 n.6 (1981); 
McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
243. See, e.g., St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-07 (1993); 
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. 
244. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253. 
245. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 515-516; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-56; see also McDonnell 
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804. 
246. Krieger, supra note 228, at 1179. Krieger goes on to provide examples: 
(1) Evidence that the objective data maintained by the defendant did not 
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The third erroneous assumption is that disparate treatment 
jurisprudence accounts for the fact that race and sex categorization "may 
distort perception, memory, and recall for decision-relevant events such that, 
at the moment of decision, an employer may be entirely unaware of the effect of an 
employee's group membership on the decision-making process.,,247 In essence, 
according to Krieger, current disparate treatment jurisprudence wrongly 
construes how discriminatory motivation accounts for judgmental strategies 
that employers use in decision making. This occurs in three ways. First, it 
assumes that discrimination occurs when a decision maker refuses to 
consider an individual for a particular position.248 Further, it assumes that 
the decision arises out of antipathy for that individual's social group or 
because placing the individual in the position in question violates role 
expectations for members of the individual's social groUp.249 Second, 
disparate treatment jurisprudence assumes that stereotypes can cause 
discrimination when group status is consciously used as a "proxy" for some 
other job-relevant trait. 250 Third, it assumes that discrimination occurs at 
the precise moment of the employer's decision making.251 
Another assumption of disparate treatment jurisprudence is that 
decision-makers possess adequate access to their own thoughts as to why 
they will make or have made certain decisions. 252 As such, it assumes that 
decision-makers are aware of the reasons they will make, or have made, 
employment decisions. 253 With such knowledge, well intentioned 
decision-makers comply with Title VII.254 In contrast, decision-makers 
with bad intentions know when they are taking an employee's group status 
into account; when challenged, they design "pretexts" to cover their 
tracks. 255 
Though it may not be routine for courts to analyze employment 
discrimination through an unconscious bias lens, such analysis is not new. 
Courts have refused to grant defendant-employers summary judgment in 
Title VII cases given employers' "hidden or unconscious [discriminatory] 
support the result reached by the decision-maker; (2) Evidence that the 
decision-maker seemed to undervalue or ignore facts favorable to the 
employee; (3) Evidence that the decision-maker made a judgment about the 
plaintiff without being able to point to specific events which would 
reasonably support such a judgment; or (4) Evidence showing that similarly 
situated Anglo employees were on occasion treated more favorably. 
Krieger, supra note 228, at 1180. 
247. Id. at 1167. 
248. Id. at 1181-82. 
249. Id. 
250. Id. at 1182. 
251. Id. at 1183. 
252. !d. at 1167. 
253. Id. at 1185. 
254. !d. 
255. Idat 1185. 
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motives.,,256 In fact, Shaw v. Cassar highlighted that: 
Overt and blatant discrimination IS a relatively rare 
phenomenon. . .. It is intentional discrimination in its covert 
hidden form that now poses the real problem. Evidence of illicit 
intent may be extremely difficult to obtain, whether the responsible 
individuals are conscious of their bias, and therefore likely to try to 
hide it, or whether they are expressing unconscious bias through 
some discretionary decision-making process. 257 
31 
Courts have similarly found that unconscious race bias258 and gender 
stereotyping259 may be implicated under Title VII. Parks and Rachlinski's 
research suggests that unconscious race bias, and to some degree gender 
stereotyping, were pervasive in the 2008 presidential campaign. 260 And 
such biases are analogously manifested under Title VII case law. 261 
D. UNCONSCIOUS VOTER BIAS AND EVALUATION OF MICHELLE OBAMA 
Given espoused societal norms of fairness and egalitarianism in the 
United States, explicit racism and sexism are not likely to underlie most 
citizens' attitudes about Mrs. Obama. Implicit bias research findings, 
however, suggest that voters' negative attitudes about her likely arise from 
unconscious attitudes about race and gender. Such unconscious bias is 
evident in two ways. First, critiques of Michelle Obama provide a glimpse 
into voters' attitudes toward her. Second, exit polls from the Democratic 
primaries, coupled with voting behavior for Senator Clinton or Senator 
Obama, provide additional indicia of such biases. 
Critiques of Mrs. Obama on blogs and in website news story 
comments, for example, arguably do not reflect a systematic sampling of 
likely voters' attitudes about her. As a result, they are simply stray 
remarks, which provide little useful insight into the pervasiveness of any 
256. Oxman v. WLS-TV, 609 F. Supp. 1384, 1387 (N.D. III. 1985). 
257. Shaw v. Cassar, 558 F. Supp. 303, 316 (E.D. Mich. 1983) (quoting Elizabeth 
Bartholet, Proof of Discriminatory Intent under Title VII: U.S. Postal Servo Bd. of 
Governors V. Aikens, 70 CAL. L. REv. 1201, 1203 (1982)). 
258. Bush v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 990 F.2d 928, 931-32 (7th Cir 1993) 
(holding that an employer's failure to adhere to its own set of rules invites "subjective 
determinations likely to reflect unconscious racial bias ... "). 
259. Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 61 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that 
gender stereotyping includes "subtle cognitive phenomena which can skew perceptions and 
judgments"). 
260. Parks & Rachlinski, supra note 2, at 46. 
261. !d. at note 2, at 41-44; See, e.g., EEOC v. Inland Marine Indus., 729 F.2d 1229, 
1236 (holding that racial discrimination occurs where subjective employment criteria 
embody racially discriminatory attitudes, even where intent is not established); See, e.g., 
Sweeney v. Bd. of Tr. of Keene State College, 604 F.2d 106, 113 (sex discrimination case 
affirming judgment for plaintiff because the district court reasonably concluded that the 
decision not to promote plaintiff was "determined by a subtle, if unexpressed, bias against 
women"). 
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racially or gender-biased attitudes. In employment discrimination cases 
where plaintiffs produce evidence of comments made by a non-decision-
maker or a decision-maker unrelated to the employment action to 
demonstrate pretext, courts dismiss such "stray remarks.,,262 Some circuits, 
however, reject the "stray remarks" doctrine. 263 Further, in Reeves v. 
Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., the Supreme Court suggested that 
even where stray remarks are not made in the context of the employment 
decision, they are still probative in assessing discriminatory animus. 264 
Thus, stray remarks should be probative, particularly in light of people's 
implicit biases. 265 In the context of elections, voters actually serve as 
decision-makers and the decisions they make (Le., through voting) are 
ultimately related to the critique that their decisions are race-based, gender-
based, or both. As such, with regards to the 2008 election primary, 
comments by voters fall outside of the stray remarks paradigm. 
Here, in describing her physical features, one commentator on the 
Hujjington Post indicated that Mrs. Obama was reminiscent of Zira one 
of the characters on Planet of the Apes.266 This comment, if not a blatantly 
racial attack, which it did not seem to be, is explainable by Goff and 
colleagues' research on Whites' unconscious association of Blacks with 
apes. 267 The use of the ape image in depicting Blacks has been held to be 
probative in employment discrimination cases. 268 
262. McMillan v. Mass. Soc'y for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 140 F.3d 288, 
300-01 (1st Cir. 1998). 
263. Mattenson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 438 F.3d 763, 770-71 (7th Cir. 2006); 
Fisher v. Pharrnacia & Upjohn, 225 F.3d 915, 922-23 (8th Cir. 2000); Russell v. McKinney 
Hosp. Venture, 235 F.3d 219, 226-29 (5th Cir. 2000). 
264. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing, 530 U.S. 133, 152·53 (2000). 
265. Ivan E. Bodensteiner, The Implications of Psychological Research Related to 
Unconscious Discrimination and Implicit Bias in Proving Intentional Discrimination, 73 Mo. L. 
REv. 83,96-99 (2008). 
266. Posting of mcnairbo to Michelle Obama Predicts Ohio Victory, HUFFINGTON POST, 
Feb. 15, 2008 http://www.huffingtonpost.coml2008/02/15/michelle-obama-predicts-o..Jl_ 
86896.html. (Feb. 15,2008,15:16 EDT). 
267. See supra notes 140-142 and 181-188 and accompanying text. 
268. See Green v. Franklin Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis, 459 F.3d 903, 911-12 (8th Cir. 
2006) (plaintiff was called a "monkey"); Webb v. Worldwide Flight Serv., Inc., 407 F.3d 1192, 
1193 (11th Cir. 2005) (plaintiff was called a "monkey"); White v. BFI Waste Servs. LLC, 375 
F.3d 288, 298 (4th Cir. 2004) (noting that "[t]o suggest that a human being's physical appearance 
is essentially a caricature of a jungle beast goes far beyond the unflattering; it is degrading and 
humiliating in the extreme); Reedy v. Quebecor Printing Eagle, Inc., 333 FJd 906,909 (8th Cir. 
2003) (plaintiff was threatened with drawings of an ape accompanied by the phrase "aU niggers 
must die"); Spriggs v. Diamond Auto Glass, 242 F.3d 179, 182 (4th Cir. 2001) (plaintiff was 
called a "monkey''); Jeffries v. Metro-Mark. Inc., 45 F.3d 258, 260 (8th Cir. 1995) (plaintiff was 
called a "monkey"); Daniels v. Pipefitters' Ass'n Local Union No. 597,945 F.2d 906, 910 (7th 
Cir. 1991) (plaintiffs were called "porch monkeys" and "baboons"). The use of primates as a 
racial slur was used to intimidate Blacks in other contexts. Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F.2d 
527,531 (1st Cir. 1976) (in a school desegregation case, White students harassed Black students 
by chanting "assassinate the nigger apes"). 
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Whites' unconscious attitudes about Mrs. Obama, however, likely go 
beyond her physical appearance to her philosophical leanings. For 
example, the fact that she is a Black person may be less of an issue for 
some White voters than the fact that she has a strong racial identity. 
Preference for greater approximation to the majority, phenotypically 
speaking, happens even at the unconscious level. 269 Analogously, it may 
also be the case with regards to ideology.27o In the employment context, 
defendants have been held to have discriminated against Black employees 
for being deemed "too ethnic" or "pro_Black.,,271 
Regarding gender there may also be an unconscious underpinning to 
voters' conscious expectations about what roles their First Lady can and 
should assume. 272 For example, voters may have an unconscious 
expectation that Mrs. Obama fit within a certain gendered paradigm, 
philosophically. Being an opinionated Ivy League graduate and lawyer 
may not fit these expectations. Though Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins did 
not speak in terms of unconscious gender stereotyping, it was clear that the 
plaintiff in that case walked a tightrope, having to be masculine enough to 
compete in a male-dominated environment for a promotion on the one hand 
and not be too masculine on the other hand. 273 
Additionally, even where critiques of Mrs. Obama have been more 
substantive e.g., questions about her patriotism these criticisms, too, 
fall within the implicit bias paradigm about race and Americanness.274 
Under Title VII, courts have held that excluding employees beyond the 
bounds of patriotism, but based on race, establishes a prima facie case for 
employment discrimination. 275 
Finally, Democratic primary exit polling data also suggest that implicit 
biases (primarily race and gender) influence voters' decisions. 276 Political 
conservati vism is associated with unconscious in-group bias.217 This is 
particularly true of race and is disambiguated from mere conservative 
ideology.278 This should be no surprise given that "[o]ne major criterion 
269. Lane, supra note 166, at 62. 
270. See supra notes 143 to 144 and accompanying text. 
271. Gordon v. JK.P Enter. Inc., No. 01-20420, 2002 WL 753496, at "'I, "'8 (5th Cir. April 
9,2002). 
272. See supra notes 129 to 136 and accompanying text. 
273. See supra notes 43 to 55 and accompanying text. 
274. See supra notes 172 to 180 and accompanying text. 
275. Zayed v. Apple Computers, No. 04-01787, 2006 WL 889571, at "'I, *10 (N.D. 
Cal. Apr. 5, 2006). 
276. See app., tbls.l-2. 
277. Cf Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific 
Foundations, 94 CAL. L. REv. 945, 958 (2006). 
278. Inna Burdein, Principled Conservatives or Covert Racists: Disentangling Racism and 
Ideology Through Implicit Measures, (May 2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, State Univ. of 
New York, Stony Brook) (on file with Hastings Women's Law Journal), available at 
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continually reappears in distinguishing left from right: attitudes toward 
equality. The left favors greater equality, while the right inevitably sees 
society as hierarchical.,,279 Nonetheless, liberalism and conservativism 
should not be viewed as dichotomous categories, but rather should be 
viewed on a continuum. In this way, there are relative conservatives on the 
Left and relative liberals on the Right - those slightly left or right of 
center. Thus, across the political spectrum, individuals may harbor racial 
or gender biases. For example, despite the fact that Liberals explicitly 
report greater racial egalitarianism than Conservatives,280 at the implicit 
level, they both have high levels of subconscious anti-Black bias - 61.1 
percent for Liberals and 73.6 percent for Conservatives.28I To gauge 
political conservativism among Democratic primary voters, we used 
proxies. Age, education, and socio-economic status have long predicted 
political orientation, with those who are 01der,282 less educated,283 and 
poorer284 being more politically conservative. As illustrated in Table 1, 
those who voted for Senator Clinton over Senator Obama tended to be 
older, poorer, and less educated than Senator Obama's supporters. This 
does not suggest that gender and race were not simultaneously driving 
forces in how Democrats cast their ballots. As previously noted, despite 
the fact that racism and sexism are opposite sides of the same coin, when 
analyzed simultaneously, race tends to be more of a driving force. 285 
IV. THIRD-PARTY STANDING AND VOTERIEMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION 
No empirical research has been conducted on the role of candidates' 
third-party associations and individuals' attitudes and voting behavior 
towards those candidates. However, it stands to reason that negative 
depictions of (potential) First Ladies reflect not only upon them but upon 
their spouses as well. As commentators expressly noted in discussing 
Michelle Obama, "in modem politics, the marriage partnership is integral to 
the quest for the presidency, as voters evaluate a candidate in light of the 
relationship with his or her spouse.,,286 As such, in this section we seek to 
http://dspace.sunyconnect.suny.edulbitstreamlI951143111111 100402 I 80.sbu.pdf. 
279. ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE THIRD WAY: THE RENEWAL OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 40 
(1998). 
280. Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 277. 
281. !d. 
282. Francis D. Glamser, The Importance of Age to Conservative Opinions: A 
Multivariate Analysis, 29 J. GERONTOLOGY 549, 551 (1974). 
283. !d.; Jaime L. Napier & John T. Jost, The "Antidemocratic Personality'" 
Revisited: A Cross-National Investigation of Working-Class Authortarianism, 64 J. Soc. 
ISSUES 595, 612 (2008). 
284. !d. at 612. 
285. Timberlake & Estes, supra note 106. 
286. Christi Parsons, Bruee Japsen & Bob Seeter, Barack's Rock, CHI. TRlB., Apr. 
22,2007, at 1. 
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shed light on this position by exploring the treatment of associative 
discrimination under Title VII law. 
A. THIRD-PARTY ASSOCIATIVE DISCRIMINA nON 
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, the Supreme Court delineated the 
requirements for a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII. 287 This 
standard, requiring that the plaintiff be a member of a protected class, is not 
uniformly easy to plead, especially when the plaintiff's claim of discrimination 
is associative. 288 Third-party associative discrimination is discrimination 
against individuals due to their relationship with Title VII protected class 
members. This type of discrimination claim is difficult to make, because the 
plaintiff is not necessarily a member of a protected class. 289 Strictly construed, 
none of the Title VII categories are broad enough to protect discrimination 
against third-party actors. 290 In fact, the statutory language seems to limit 
claims under Title VII to instances that arise "because of such individual's 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.,,291 
Early cases dealing with third-party associative discrimination under Title 
VII held that plaintiffs lacked standing. In 1973 an Alabama district court held 
in Ripp v. Dobbs House, Inc. that a White man who was tenninated from his 
job due to his association with Black co-workers lacked standing. 292 The court 
indicated that the plaintiff was "not a 'person aggrieved' within the 
contemplation of the Act.,,293 In 1981, the Northern District of Georgia 
decided in Adams v. Governor's Committee on Postsecondary Education that 
the White plaintiff, who alleged employment discrimination for having a Black 
wife, lacked standing. 294 The court relied on the rationale propounded in 
Ripp.295 Two years later, in Parr v. United Family Life Insurance Co., the 
Northern District of Georgia affinned its decision in Adams when it refused to 
allow a White plaintiff to state a cause of action under Title VII, based on the 
fact that he was married to a Black woman. 296 
287. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The court held that: 
The elements comprising a plaintiffs prima facie case were initially defined 
as (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was 
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, 
despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, 
the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants 
from persons of complainant's qualifications. 
288. Mark W. Honeycutt, II & Van D. Turner, Jr., Third-party Associative 
Discrimination Under Title VII, 68 TENN. L. REv. 913 (2001). 
289. Id. 
290. Id. at 915. 
291. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000). 
292. Ripp v. Dobbs House, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 205,209 (N.D. Ala. 1973). 
293. Id. 
294. Adams v. Governor's Comm. On Postsecondary Educ., et aI., No. 80-624A, 
1981 WL 27101, at "'I, "'3 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 3,1981). 
295. Adams, No. 80-624A, 1981 WL27101, at "'I, *3. 
296. Parr v. United Family Life Ins. Co., No. 83-26-6, 1983 WL 1774, at *1, *2 
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One of the first cases to sustain a cause of action for third-party 
associative discrimination was the 1975 case of Whitney v. Greater New 
York Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists. 297 In Whitney, a White plaintiff 
sued her employer after she was allegedly fired for having a social 
relationship with a Black man. 298 Rejecting the Ripp analysis, the Southern 
District of New York held that "the plaintiffs race was as much a factor in 
the decision to fire her as that of her friend.,,299 In addition to other district 
courts,300 various circuit courts have also affirmed third-party associative 
standing. In 1998, the Fifth Circuit, in Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., held that Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based 
on interracial relationships. 301 In Deffenbaugh-Williams, the plaintiff was a 
White female manager discriminated against because of her relationship 
with a Black male sales associate. 302 A year later in Tetro v. Elliott 
Popham Pontiac, Inc., Tetro (a White male employee) indicated that he 
began to be treated differently by his employer once his employer noticed 
that Tetro had a bi-racial daughter. 303 The Sixth Circuit held that Tetro's 
discharge was within the scope of Title VII. 304 In 1996, the Tenth Circuit, 
in Zeigler v. K-mart Corp., held for the plaintiff, a Black woman, who 
married a White male employee and had a child by him.305 Under Title VII 
and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, the court found that K-Mart 
(N.D. Ga. June 15, 1983). 
297. Whitney v. Greater N.Y. Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists, 401 F. Supp. 1363 
(S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
298. Id. at 1365. 
299. Id. at 1367. 
300. See Rosenblatt v. Bivona & Cohen, 969 F. Supp. 207 (SD.N.Y. 1997) 
(determining that White male plaintiff, who believed he was discriminated against because 
he had a Black wife and bi-racial child, had third-party standing based on racial 
discrimination under Title VII); Schutt v. County of Napa, No. C-94 2115 SC, 1995 WL 
494588, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 1995) (determining that White female plaintiff, who 
believed she was discriminated against for becoming pregnant by a Black co-worker, had 
third-party standing based on racial discrimination under Title VII); Probst v. Reno, No. 94-
C-691, 1995 WL 613129, at *1 (N.D. lll. Oct. 17, 1995) (holding for a White male plaintiff, 
who believed she was discriminated against for being romantically involved with a Black 
male co-worker); Erwin v. Mister Omlet of Am., Inc., No. C-89-529-WS, 1991 WL 32248, 
at *1-*3 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 15, 1991) (determining that White female plaintiff, who believed 
she was discriminated against for being romantically involved with a Black co-worker, had 
third-party standing based on racial discrimination under Title VII); Gresham v. Waffle 
House, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 1442, 1445 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (holding for a White female plaintiff, 
who believed she was discriminated against because she had a Black husband); Holiday v. 
Belle's Restaurant, 409 F. Supp. 904,905,908-09 (W.D. Pa. 1976) (determining that White 
female plaintiff, who believed she was discriminated against for being married to a Black 
man, had third-party standing based on racial discrimination under Title VII). 
301. Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 156 F.3d 581, 589 (5th Cir. 
1998). 
302. Id. at 585. 
303. Tetro v. Elliott Popham Pontiac, Inc., 173 F.3d 988,990 (6th Cir. 1999). 
304. Tetro, 173 F.3d at 995. 
305. Zeigler v. K-Mart Corp., No. 95-3019, 1996 WL 8021, at *4-*6 (10th Cir. Jan. 
10, 1996). 
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discriminated against the plaintiff based upon her interracial marriage and 
ensuing pregnancy.306 When Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Insurance 
Co. reached the appellate level, Parr (a White man) sued under Title VII, 
asserting that he was fired because he was married to a Black woman. 307 
The Eleventh Circuit expressly repudiated Ripp and held for the plaintiff. 308 
B. WHAT THIS MEANT FOR SENATOR OBAMA'S CANDIDACY 
Although associative discrimination has not received specific attention 
in social science literature, the findings of social identity theory highlight 
categorization processes that motivate intergroup attitudes and behavior.309 
Because individuals are assumed to have a desire to maintain a high level 
of self-esteem/ lo the theory suggests that people engage in social 
comparisons with others to seek a positively valued distinctiveness for the 
social categories to which they belong as compared to other categories. 31 1 
As individuals define themselves in terms of specific group memberships, 
they come to view and evaluate themselves based on the prototypical 
characteristics of the group.312 By engaging in social comparisons, people 
differentiate between their in-groups and relevant out-groups and are able 
to evaluate their social identities. 313 Beyond such differentiation, social 
identity research also demonstrates that people tend to hold differential 
expectancies about the behavior of in-group and out-group members. In 
particular, they expect in-group members to display more desirable, and 
fewer undesirable, behaviors than out-group members. 314 Furthermore, 
they are more likely to infer negative dispositions from undesirable out-
group behaviors than from undesirable in-group behaviors and are less 
likely to infer positive dispositions from desirable out-group behaviors than 
from desirable in-group behaviors. 315 
306. Zeigler, 1996 WL 8021, at *4-*6. 
307. Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 889 (Ilth Cir. 
1986). 
308. Id. at 891-92. 
309. JOHN C. TURNER ET AL., REDISCOVERING THE SOCIAL GROUP: A SELF-
CATEGORIZATION TTHEORY 42-67 (1987). 
310. John C. Turner, Social Categorization and the Self-concept: A Social Cognitive 
Theory oJGroup Behavior, in 2 ADVANCES IN GROUP PROCESSES 77-121 (Edward J. Lawler 
ed., 1985). 
311. Id. 
312. See generally SOCIAL IDENTITY AND INTERGROUP RELATIONS (Henri TajfeJ ed., 
1982). 
313. Henri TajfeJ & John C. Turner, An Integrative Theory oj Intergroup Conflict, in 
THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS 33-47 (William G. Austin & Stephen 
Worchel eds., 1979). 
314. John W. Howard, & Myron Rothbart, Social Categorization and Memory Jor 
In-Group and Out-Group Behavior, 38 J. OF PERSONAUTY AND SOC. PSYCHOL., 301, 302, 
308 (1980). 
315. Miles Hewstone & Joseph Jaspars, Social Dimensions oj Attribution, in 2 THE 
SOCIAL DIMENSION: EUR. DEVELOPMENTS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 379-404 (Henri Tajfel ed., 
1984). 
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Such associative discrimination has been observed within political 
contexts. For example, during Jesse Jackson's 1984 presidential run, there 
was tremendous pressure on him to reject and denounce a person who 
ultimately became a litmus test for many Black leaders - Minister Louis 
Farrakhan. 316 Similarly, during the current campaign, Senator Obama had to 
"reject and denounce" Minister Farrakhan simply because Minister 
Farrakhan made some positive remarks about Senator Obama.317 Senator 
Obama has also received considerable criticism for his association with his 
former pastor, Reverend Jeremiah Wright, whom some Whites perceive to be 
racist and unpatriotic. 318 
In light of these occurrences, Michelle Obama may have brought a 
considerable amount of baggage to her husband's campaign. Given implicit 
attitudes based on gender and/or race, voters may hold negative perceptions 
of Mrs. Obama. However, ultimately, the person who bore the burden of 
these voters' concerns was Senator Obama, as voters' attitudes about 
Michelle Obama may indirectly have affected their decision to support 
Senator Obama's candidacy. Optimistically, the findings of research 
exploring the reputations of women who were associated with United States 
Presidents suggest that this might not be the case. 319 According to 
Simonton's study, the direct association between Presidents' and First 
Ladies' reputations can be described as a "reflected-glory effect," as the 
President's reputation was found to contribute to the First Lady's reputation 
although there was no reciprocal effect. 320 Because the study's sample only 
included First Ladies up to Nancy Reagan, however, we have little insight 
into the effects of gender roles and attitudes post-1989 on the study's 
findings. 321 Further, the influence of race might represent an important 
boundary condition to the study's findings. Thus, voters' perceptions of 
Michelle Obama, and the subsequent influence on Barack Obama's 
candidacy, have important implications for understanding the associative 
discrimination phenomenon. 
316. See, e.g., Eric Pianin, Jackson Declines to Denounce Farrakhan, Despite 
Statements, WASH. POST, July 2, 1984, at AS. 
317. Charles Hurt, Presidential Obama The Winner of Key Debate, N.Y. POST, Feb. 
27,2008, at 5. 
318. Erin Aubry Kaplan, Black and Mad: The Controversy Over Obama's Pastor 
Reflects White Fear of African-American Anger, BALT. SUN, Mar. 20, 2008, at A13. 
319. See generally D. K. Simonton, President's Wives and First Ladies: On 
Achieving Eminence within a Traditional Gender Role, 35 SEX ROLES 309, 330-32 (1996). 
320. Id. at 330. 
321. Id. at 313. This is significant because, quite possibly, the most controversial 
First Lady was Senator Hillary Clinton and the most controversial potential First Lady was 
Theresa Heinz-Kerry. And both of these women emerged on the national scene after Nancy 
Reagan. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Americans have made remarkable gains with regard to race and gender 
issues. However, even as late as 2008, the reality of color and gender 
equality and blindness is still illusive. Moreover, despite the fact that the 
forty-fourth President of the United States will be a Black person and 
despite Senator Clinton's historic run, the candidacies of Senators Obama 
and Clinton highlight the realities of implicit bias in politics. This implicit 
bias, though, is not bound by the four comers of presidential campaigning. 
An appropriate corollary is the employment sphere given the analogous 
decision-making processes in both. Just as courts and commentators have 
begun to think about the role of the intersection of race and gender, implicit 
bias, and third-party associative discrimination in Title VII cases, it seems 
fitting that all three should be applicable to the 2008 presidential race with 
Michelle Obama being the point of analysis. 
This is where we are. A more forward looking approach, in light of 
Michelle Obama, raises the question of how the inclusion of groups in 
spheres where they have typically been excluded is beneficial to society. 
Michelle Obama' s presence during Senator Obama' s run for the White 
House and her future role as First Lady has and will go a long way towards 
undermining stereotypes about Black women. For centuries, Black women 
have been subject to any number of stereotypical images. Under the 
mammy image, Black women have been stereotyped as loyal domestic 
servants to Whites who cared for White families more than their own. 322 
Under the sexual siren image, Black women have been portrayed as 
sexually aggressive, uncaring whores concerned with nothing but their own 
sexual satisfaction. 323 Under the welfare mother or queen image, Black 
women have been seen as nothing more than "breeding animals who have 
no desire to work, but are content to live off the state .... ,,324 Under the 
matriarch image, they have been stereotyped as mother within the Black 
home "a controlling, emasculating Black woman who dictated to both 
her children and her man their place in the home.,,325 A variant of the 
latter, the angry Black woman, is "achievement-oriented, kind of no-
nonsense, overworked, exhausted, not particularly kind or compassionate, 
but very driven.,,326 Historically, positive public images of Black women 
have helped to undermine these stereotypes. 327 
322. Jennifer Bailey Woodard & Teresa Mastin, Black Womanhood: Essence and its 
Treatment o/Stereotypicallmages 0/ Black Women, 36 J. BLACK STUDIES 264, 271 (2005). 
323. Id. at 272. 
324. Id. at 273. 
325. Id. at 271. 
326. Vanessa E. Jones, The Angry Black Woman: Tart-tongued or Driven and No-
nonsense, She is a Stereotype that Amuses Some and Offends Others, BOSTON GLOBE, April 
20, 2008, at Fl. 
327. Stevina U. Evuleocha & Steve D. Ugbah, Stereotypes, Counter-Stereotypes, and 
Black Television Images in the 1990s, 13 W. J. BLACK STUDIES 197 (1989). 
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Within the workplace, as well as other domains, efforts to embrace and 
encourage diversity are meant to overcome the thumb on the scale that 
implicit biases place against women and minorities in the present. 328 
Hiring or promoting people to prominent positions that are contrary to their 
stereotypes can force people to confront their implicit biases.329 Voters in 
the Democratic primaries and caucuses at least had to confront the prospect 
of voting for a woman or Black man, which is something they never have 
had to seriously face in years past. The same was true in the general 
election. Making the choice might have inspired voters who harbor 
implicit biases to become aware of these biases and make efforts to reduce 
them, or at least eliminate their influence on judgment. This may be 
particularly so where the First Lady is a Black woman. 
Current models of prejudice and stereotype reduction support the view 
that the 2008 election and its result will reduce the effect of implicit biases 
overall. This work reveals that what helps people avoid the influence of 
implicit biases are: 1) awareness of their bias; 330 2) motivation to change 
their responses because of personal values, feelings of guilt, compunction, 
or self-insight; 33 I and 3) possession of the cognitive resources necessary to 
develop and practice correction. 332 Regardless of the outcome, the 2008 
election may have facilitated all of these factors. Exposing people to 
examples that run counter to stereotypes reduces the level of implicit 
invidious bias.333 For example, showing people images of esteemed Blacks 
reduces the anti-Black bias on the IAT.334 Much the same is true gender. 33S 
328. Jerry Kang & Mahzarin Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist Revision 
of "Affirmative Action," 94 CAL. L. REv. 1063,1067-81 (2006). 
329. Jerry Kang, Professor, UCLA School of Law, Behavioral Realism: Future 
History of Implicit Bias and the Law, (November 2006), available at 
http://jerrykang.netlEngage. 
330, Nilanjana Dasgupta, ImpliCit Ingroup Favoritism, Outgroup Favoritism, and 
Their Behavioral Manifestations, 17 SOC. JUST. REs. 143, 157-58 (2004). 
331. !d. 
332. Nilanjana Dasgupta & Anthony G. Greenwald, On the Malleability of 
Automatic Attitudes: Combating Automatic Prejudice with Images of Admired and Disliked 
Individuals, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 800, 803-05 (2001); Irene V. Blair & 
Mahzarin R. Banaji, Automatic and Controlled Processes in Stereotype Priming, 70 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1142,1145-1148 (1996). 
333. Dasgupta & Greenwald, supra note 332, at 806. 
334. !d. 
335. Social environments can undermine automatic gender stereo typic beliefs 
expressed by women. Results revealed that when women are in social contexts that expose 
them to female leaders, they are less likely to express automatic stereotypic beliefs about 
their in-group. They also found that the frequency of exposure to women leaders (i.e., 
female faculty) mediates the long-term effect of social environments (women's college 
versus coed college) on automatic gender stereotyping. Additionally, some academic 
environments (e.g., classes in male-dominated disciplines like science and math) produce an 
, increase in automatic stereotypic beliefs among students at the coed college but not at the 
women's college. This effect was mediated by the sex of the course instructors. See 
Nilanjana Dasgupta & Shaki Asgari, Seeing Is Believing: Exposure to Counterstereotypic 
Women Leaders and Its Effect on the Malleability of Automatic Gender Stereotyping, 40 J. 
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Indeed, simply imagining people that are contrary to invidious implicit 
stereotypes reduces the bias.336 In light of this research, a prospective look 
at Michelle Obama's roles as First Lady suggests that it will work to 
undermine both non-Black and Black peoples' stereotypes of Black 
women. 
EXPERIMENTAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 642,647-48,650-53 (2004). 
336. See Irene v. Blair, et aI., Imagining Stereotypes Away: The Moderation of 
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29/69 44/53 34/64 29nO 34/66 34/66 0 
49/48 63/35 60136 54/44 67126 47/51 C 
30165 61/36 46/51 34/65 55/42 32167 0 
39/59 63/35 58/40 54/44 66/31 49/48 c 
42/55 52/45 55/42 40/56 66/32 38/60 C 
43156 62/36 60/38 58/39 69128 54143 C 
46136 64123 69123 37/45 60/18 36162 C 
44153 65126 55/39 45/51 64128 50/46 C 
--n ~ ~ > m 




en = t"" Q. ~ •. ~ 
w 
0 w .... 
~ 
25170 53142 39/50 36164 43/45 35/65 0 
30/66 48/41 35/57 35/56 47142 33/61 0 
33/64 48/47 36/60 42/55 35/58 44152 0 
24176 44/56 36/62 32168 37/62 35164 0 
26173 58/41 44/54 38/62 47/51 36161 0 
35161 69/28 56/42 50/50 65133 42153 C 
47/53 67133 59/39 54/46 69130 58142 C !:? 
::r .a 























Primary! Race Sex Age 
Caucus 
B Lor W M F 18 - 24 65+ 
At 
TXPrimary If:J84 66/32 55/44 47/51 54/45 40/59 61135 
VfPrimary 38160 35164 42/56 31i64 41/58 
MSPrimarv:i: 15/84 57/39 47/49 48/49 30/65 61/36 
PAPrimary 10/90 63/37 59141 40/60 62/38 47/53 
IN Primary 11189 60/40 52148 39/61 65135 39/61 
NC Primaryj; 7/91 61/37 43/55 25/74 53/44 30/69 
\VVPrimary 69/23 73/22 59(35 71124 72/23 
RY Primary 7/90 72123 67/29 54141 78118 63136 
OR Primary 42/57 48/51 29f71 45/54 31/69 
MT Primary 11189 41156 47/50 25174 52/45 35/64 
SDPrimary 56/44 57/43 33/67 66/34 52148 
Totals '--- 0/28 9J'3 _ 2819 11L26_ 17/19 10126 25/12 
Within each category, numbers indicate percentage points won by Clinton/Ohama 
Race: B = Black; A = Asian; L = Latino(a); W = White 
Sex:M ::::Male; F= Female 
Age: 18-24 == youngest age group; 65+ ::: oldest age group 
Family Education Winner 
Income 
<50K >100K Low High 
52/47 43/56 71129 46/54 C 
36160 34/65 53/47 33/65 0 
31166 51149 39f61 38/61 0 
54146 54/46 64/36 53/47 C 
50/50 52/48 54/46 44156 C 
37/60 42156 37/60 41/59 0 
71f23 58135 67122 55140 C 
67/29 66130 72124 56139 C 
45/54 33/66 53/46 34f66 0 
42154 39/59 48149 35/63 0 
58142 50150 57143 47/53 C 
19/17 11125 25110 8117 ---
Education: Low = lowest index of education (high school graduate); High = highest index of education (postgraduate study) 
Winner; 0 "" Obama; C ::: Clinton 
Primary/Caucus: t = Black population of 300/0 or more 
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Table 2. Express Gender and Race Influence in the 2008 Democratic 
Primary338 
Primary/ Gender Race Winner 
Caucus Influence Influence 
Yes No Yes No 
AL Primaryi 35/62 45/53 41/56 42/56 0 
AZ Primary 56/40 48/43 62/32 46/46 C 
AR Primary 71123 69/28 35/62 69/28 C 
CA Primary* 61138 51/42 70/27 47/47 C 
CT Primary 41156 47/50 68/29 41/57 0 
DE Primary 28/59 45/52 47/41 41/56 0 
GA Primaryi 24/72 34/65 42/54 29/69 0 
IL Primary 27/72 36/62 42/56 31/67 0 
MA Primary 51144 57/41 76119 51147 C 
MO Primary 46/50 43/54 53/43 42/55 0 
NJPrimary 47/49 55/42 72/25 49/48 C 
NM Primary 59/40 46/51 84115 39/58 C 
NY Primary 56/42 58/39 81119 50/46 C 
OK Primary 64/19 51136 56/24 54/34 C 
TN Primary 52/42 54/41 59/33 53/43 C 
UT Primary -/- 39/58 69/28 35/61 0 
LA Primary:j: 38/53 36/57 39/54 36/57 0 
OH Primary 59/39 53/45 60/40 53/45 C 
TXPrimary 52/47 51148 60/40 48/50 C 
VT Primary 42/58 38/60 37/33 32/66 0 
MS Primaryi 36/62 39/58 29/69 42/56 0 
PA Primary 59/41 54/46 72/28 50/50 C 
IN Primary 53/47 51149 59/41 50/50 C 
NC Primaryt 35/64 44/54 43/54 42/56 0 
WV Primary 82/12 62/30 75/19 65/27 C 
KY Primary 81116 61135 79119 63/33 C 
OR Primary 47/53 40/59 55/44 38/61 0 
MT Primary 50/47 40/58 65/33 37/60 0 
SD Primary 60/40 54/46 67/33 52/48 C 
338 Voters were asked, "In deciding your vote for president today, was the race of the 
candidate [important]?" Supra note 337. Voters were also asked, "In deciding your vote for 
president today, was the gender of the candidate [important]?" Supra note 337. 
